EX. NR. 53

[redacted]

KONINKLIJKE LUCHTMACHT

INLICHTINGEN

SAMENVATTING

(ISAM)

7174

UITGEGEVEN DOOR DE LUCHTMACHTSTAF / SECTIE L 2

[redacted]

MINISTERIE VAN DEFENSIE
LUCHTMACHTSTAF

KLASSIFIKATIE: [redacted]
EXEMPLAAR NR.: VAN 5

Sectie: L2

's-Gravenhage, 10 juli 1

Nr. : L2/0964/J-74

INLICHTINGENSAMENVATTING

(ISAM 7/74)

	Aantal blz.:	Class
I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DEEL I	23	[redacted]
DEEL II	8	[redacted]
II - SOVIET POWER AFTER SALT I	8	ONGEK
III - OVERZICHT NATO-NAMEN EN SOVJET-BENAMINGEN VAN SOVJET-BLOK VLIEGTUIGEN	8	[redacted]
IV - WARSCHAU PAKT AIRBORNE JAMMERS	9	[redacted]
V - VOORBEREIDE NATUURLIJKE VLIEG-VELDEN IN TSJECHOSLOWAKIJE	7	[redacted]
VI - 25 JAAR COMECON	7	ONGEK

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VERZENDLIJST

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Voorzitter van het Comité Verenigde Chefs van Staven	2	1)
C- CTL	3	
C- Vlb. Soesterberg	4	
C- Vlb. Leeuwarden	5	
C- Vlb. Deelen	6	
C- Vlb. Volkel	7	
C- Vlb. Eindhoven	8	
C- Vlb. Twenthe	9	
C- Vlb. Gilze-Rijen	10	
C- NS Den Helder	11	
C- 1eGGW	12	
C- 2e GGW	13	
C- 3e GGW	14	
C- 4e GGW	15	
C- 5e GGW	16	
C- GTMGW	17	
C- CRC/SOC	18	
C- MVV Groep	19	
C- 1 LK t.a.v. C- ASOC	20	
C- CLO	21 t/m 23	2)
C- LIMOS	24	2)
C- LETS C- KKSL	25	2)
Directeur Luchtmachtstafschool	26	2)
Lumat [redacted]	27	1) 2)
LuLaMarat [redacted]	28	1) 2)
LuLaMarat [redacted]	29	1) 2)
Malumat [redacted]	30	1) 2)
Lumat [redacted]	31	1) 2)
LaLumat [redacted]	32	1) 2)
LaLumat [redacted]	33	1) 2)
LuLamat [redacted]	34	1) 2)
LaLuMarat [redacted]	35	1) 2)
LaLuMarat [redacted]	36	1) 2)
I.a.a.:		
Voorzitter v/h Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland	37	
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Hoofd LAMID	39	
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INTERN:	EX.NR.:	
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1) ter info, daarna retour L2a.

2) zonder Hoofdstuk I deel II.

3) ex. 21 en 22 ter info daarna retour L2a

II - SOVIET POWER AFTER SALT I

In de bijlage van dit hoofdstuk is een artikel uit de laatste editie van "Strategic Review" opgenomen. Dit artikel geeft een indruk van de overwegingen en factoren die bij de krachtenverhoudir van de strategische wapens tussen de VS en de SU een rol spelen. Gelet op de grote inspanning die de SU zich getroost om de kwalitatieve achterstand m.b.t. de "Mirving" van hun raketten, op de VS in te halen en de aktualiteit van het onderwerp i.v.m. de besprekir zowel tussen president Nixon en Breznjew, als in het kader van de SALT, leek opname gerechtvaardigd.

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BIJLAGE A, behorende bij
Hfdst II van ISAM 7/74.

SOVIET POWER AFTER SALT I: A STRATEGIC-COERCIVE CAPABILITY?

LEWIS A. FRANK

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IN BRIEF

The October 1973 Mideast War demonstrated the capacity and readiness of the Soviet Union to strengthen its beachhead in the Middle East. This action culminated a long build-up of Soviet military power following the embarrassing Cuban missile confrontation of 1962. Readiness of the USSR to use its military power in a time of "parity" raises grave questions about its prospective action when it enjoys superiority. SALT I did not inhibit the Soviet growth rate. There is enough latitude in the agreements to accommodate planned Soviet weapons development, on land and at sea. Soviet policy appears designed to achieve a successful nuclear war-waging capability, including an intrawar strategic-coercive capability of potentially decisive dimensions.

The declining throw weight of the U.S. and the growing throw weight of the USSR argue that the Soviet Union may achieve its strategic-coercive capability under the provisions of SALT I. The prospect raises grave questions for U.S. allies heretofore dependent upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent for survival. There is growing evidence that Soviet leadership is prepared to use nuclear advantage for political gain. Thus the provisions of SALT I are a charter not for the stability which U.S. diplomacy has proclaimed but for instability and possibly for war.

"The main means of waging war will be massive nuclear-rocket strikes for the purpose of destroying the aggressor's nuclear weapons, for the simultaneous mass destruction of the vitally important objectives constituting the enemy's military, political, and economic potential, for crushing his will to resist, and for winning victory in the shortest possible time."

V.D. Sokolovsky, Editor
Military Strategy, 1962

While the Egyptian and Syrian clients of the Soviets were being repulsed in the October 1973 "Yom Kippur" War, the Soviet Union was presenting the most serious strategic challenge to the U.S., unlike any seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This time the U.S.—preoccupied with its own airlift to Israel—was in no position to keep the Soviets from reinforcing Egypt and Syria by air and sea during the war. Direct intervention of Soviet

forces on

forces on the pretext of countering alleged Israeli cease-fire violations was apparently prevented only by the U.S. worldwide nuclear alert of October 25—an act which contributed to initial Israeli-Egyptian military talks at Kilometer 101.[1] Nevertheless, by the time the U.S. put the "lid" on escalation, the Soviets had already successfully demonstrated their ability and willingness to maintain and strengthen their political and military beachhead in the Middle East—including a reported deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Egypt.[2]

Stung by the Cuban set-back, the Soviets embarked on a massive, *balanced* nuclear *and* conventional build-up which was apparently oriented towards sustained operations in any theater of the world to support their long-term political objectives. Realizing these objectives meant building their strategic-nuclear strength to what President Nixon called "approximate nuclear parity" with the U.S. before risking another confrontation involving the direct clash of super power offensive weaponry.[3] (The Soviet involvement in North Vietnam was primarily defensive in nature, largely confined to building and manning SAM and antiaircraft artillery batteries.) Recent Soviet actions in the Middle East apparently created a high risk of nuclear war escalating from a conventional war—even when U.S. and USSR forces were not in head-on conflict. It is evident that if such risks can be raised during a moment of strategic "parity" even greater threats of nuclear war could arise in the near future should the Soviets attain strategic superiority over the U.S. They are evidently attempting to do this despite "détente" and SALT I.

The Moscow Agreement

The Five-Year Interim Offensive Agreement (IOA), negotiated during SALT I and brought into being with the 1972 ABM Treaty, does not appreciably affect the growth rate of near-term Soviet strategic offensive capability.[4] Admittedly, the IOA has committed the U.S. and the USSR to apparently specified, but actually flexible, ceilings in ICBM fixed-base launchers and SLBM launchers and boats. (See Figure I.) However, what the IOA omits is likely to be more critical and sensitive for what Secretary of State Kissinger calls "a stable strategic balance" between the U.S. and the USSR than what it includes.

The IOA does not explicitly ban land-mobile ICBMs, and the Soviets appear to be developing, if not yet deploying, these systems. The U.S., on the other hand, went on record at SALT I to declare that mobile ICBM deployment would be "inconsistent with the objectives" of this agreement.[5] More important, the IOA does not set quantitative or qualitative limits on the amount or type of thermonuclear payload (throw weight) which can be delivered by missiles or bomber aircraft. This would mean that in time, holding other factors constant, the Soviet edge in numerical ICBM strength plus ICBM throw weight potential equal to or superior to that of the U.S. would enable them to destroy significantly more targets in CONUS.

The Soviets have taken the post-SALT I initiative in deploying additional and better silo ICBMs—possibly some with "pop-up" ignition capability outside the silo for greater range or throw weight potential. Their new ICBM generation includes the SS-X-17, the heavyweight SS-X-18, and the SS-X-19 plus a potentially mobile ICBM designated SS-X-16. The first three types are apparently intended as MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) warhead successors to the SS-13, SS-9, and SS-11 respectively. The mounting seriousness with which the U.S. views their development was signalled by Secretary of State Kissinger in his September 1973 confirmation hearings. In answer to a question by Senator Carl T. Curtis concerning the new Soviet missiles, Kissinger replied: "If it turns out that these MIRVs have the size and accuracy to attack our Minuteman silos, serious questions would be raised concerning the future survivability of our ICBMs and the purpose for which the Soviets are acquiring this capability."[6]

During the summer of 1973, the Soviets flight-tested MIRVs in the North Pacific, and their large-yield (3–6 megatons) underground nuclear test of 1973 at Novaya Zemlya might be part of a program to develop as MIRVed successor to the SS-9 (the SS-X-18) capable of delivering six multi-megaton warheads against U.S. hard targets. Again signalling the Soviets, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger indicated in his news conference of November 30, 1973 that the U.S. would seriously consider adding to its own countermilitary capability should the Soviets proceed in their current fashion without any corresponding willingness

to negotiate



to negotiate further strategic controls during SALT II.[7] It is also thought in some quarters that further Soviet MIRV test programs could encompass designs for backfit onto the SS-X-16 and the new long-range SS-N-8 SLBM.[8]

In addition to land-based deployment, the Soviets are superhardening their ICBM silos and increasing the range and operational area of their Navy's fleet of ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing their vulnerability to a U.S. second strike while supporting their strategic offensive capability. In urban/industrial areas, their already sizeable civil defense (DOSAAF) program in schools, factories, and other important centers enables them to warn and disperse populations containing valuable human resources in the event of a U.S. "cities" strike contemplated by the old Assured Destruction policy of the 1960s. By adding throw weight and then bolstering it against nuclear retaliation, the Soviets appear to be following a systematic, logical approach to their survival—and even what they might view as success—in a nuclear war with the U.S., given their assumptions about the initial phases of the battle. Soviet military doctrine is extremely careful to maintain a wide range of options in both conventional and nuclear war for which *several* rationales might exist, including the need to achieve decisive superiority in surviving throw weight after the initial exchange in order to cause relatively greater damage to the enemy and be able to persuade the enemy not to resist further. This ability to have a *persuasive intrawar deterrent* is what I choose to call *strategic-coercive* capability—perhaps the only analog of "victory" which might reasonably exist in a strategic-nuclear context.

Getting ahead before a war and then staying ahead during a nuclear war are two sides of the same coin in Soviet military doctrine—although superiority after the initial exchange was blasphemed as "unthinkable" by some U.S. defense intellectuals in the 1960s. Soviet military theorists continually attempt to reconcile Clausewitz with Lenin to rationalize nuclear war-fighting concepts and thereby propound complex views with a common thread—nuclear war being a form of politics utilizing the most modern, massive means of destruction characterized by wide-

spread coordinated

spread coordinated use of both nuclear and conventional war-fighting capabilities.[9] Given the asymmetry of U.S.-Soviet political objectives, it is likely that Soviet attainment of credible strategic-nuclear superiority (deterrence plus coercive war-fighting capability) might tempt them into making extreme demands in a future crisis with the U.S. in the belief that "this time" they could afford a nuclear war. Their willingness to sacrifice millions of soldiers and civilians at Leningrad, Stalingrad, and throughout the campaign against Germany in World War II demonstrates a kind of historical tenacity which may be of inestimable psychological value in a showdown against a still-untouched U.S.*

Diplomatic Implications of Military Superiority

The first appearance of a Soviet strategic-coercive capability might occur before 1980—even by 1977 when the IOA expires. Most published estimates give too little attention to assessing the asymmetries in vulnerability between the super powers—yet it is upon vulnerability that the question of "balance" depends. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),[10] the USSR appears to have a significant margin of ICBM and SLBM throw weight superiority over the U.S.—6.5 million pounds vs. 3.8 million pounds at the end of 1972. These figures are offset by U.S. advantage in bomber throw weight. Most of the U.S. throw weight potential lies in its fleet of 240 B-52 G/H and 66 FB-111A bombers of the Strategic Air Command, with maximum payload of 33.4 million pounds, including associated SRAM stand-off missiles, and these aircraft use enormous amounts of fuel to get to their targets. Meeting range/payload requirements—even with refueling by tanker—means displacing potential payload in order to top off tanks. This means reducing bomber payload potential by as much as 50 per cent of maximum.† Thus, estimated SAC bomber throw weight is closer to 16.7 million pounds than 33.4 million pounds. Adding estimated ICBM/SLBM throw weight of 3.8 million pounds in 1,710 launchers gives the U.S. a strategic throw weight capability of 20.5 million pounds. Drawing down Soviet throw weight capabilities for postulated similar range/payload deficiencies in Long Range Aviation BEAR and BISON bombers, the Soviets estimated throw weight would also be reduced, but by a lesser amount than the U.S., to about 8.9 million pounds—6.5 million pounds in their ICBM/SLBM force of 2,150 launchers and 2.4 million pounds in the 140 BEARs and BISONs and "Dalnaya Aviatsya."

Given their force sizes and throw weights at present, the Soviets could deliver between 5.0 and 5.5 million pounds on U.S. targets in CONUS.[11] U.S. surviving forces could be expected to retaliate with a maximum of 6.0 to 6.5 million pounds. (See Table 1 for an illustrative example of U.S. second-strike power.) At present, the U.S. second strike, if directed against the withheld Soviet nuclear weapons, would be adequate to destroy enough Soviet surviving forces—such as successfully "trailed" ballistic missile submarines, withheld or refire missiles, and some dispersed bomber aircraft—to deny the Soviets the ability to emerge from a nuclear encounter with a politically decisive leverage against the U.S.[12]

Judging from their force additions and modifications under the terms of SALT I, it is possible that the Soviets could add enough new capability to triple or even quadruple their potentially survivable throw weight after a U.S. second strike, from about 0.5 to 0.6 million lbs. at the end of 1972 to about 2.0 million lbs. by the end of 1977—using IISS estimates as a starting point for calculation. In addition to ICBM development, they could enlarge the effectiveness of their undersea force by adding some 300 to 350 long-range (4000 nm) SS-N-8 SLBMs and between twenty and twenty-five Delta-class 12-tube ballistic missile submarines over the next four years—a rate consistent with past Soviet naval and missile construction programs. One cannot ignore the possibility of their using a portion of the 270-plus attack sub-

* Khrushchev was a master of "all-or-nothing" agitprop during the period of Soviet strategic inferiority vs. the U.S. While we are prone to emphasize his Cuban misadventure in 1962, it must be remembered that his skillful "missile-rattling" carried great weight with the U.S. in forcing its Anglo-French allies to call off their Suez operation in 1956—at a time when the Soviets had zero ICBM capability.

† Bomber range/payload degradation might even be higher—on the order of 75 per cent. This could further reduce U.S. second-strike potential on Soviet targets, as shown in Table I, by nearly 2 million pounds throw weight.—Ed.

TABLE I

TABLE I

EXAMPLE OF U.S. SECOND-STRIKE POTENTIAL

Mid-1973 Estimate
(in millions of pounds)

System	*Surviving TW from USSR 1st strike*	*TW lost to aborts, inflight failure*	*TW lost through penetration failure*	*TW on USSR targets*
ICBM MINUTEMAN I/II/III TITAN II	1.25	0.06	0.06	1.13
SLBM POLARIS A-2 POSEIDON C-3	1.04	0.05	0.05	0.94
Bombers B-52 G/H and FB-111A with SRAM	8.35	0.42	3.96	3.97
Totals	10.64	0.53	4.07	6.04

Note: Assume 0.95 Weapon System Reliability for all systems, and 0.95 probability of penetration for missiles or 0.50 probability of penetration for bombers. Under the Soviet first strike postulated, at least 50 per cent of throw weight in the U.S. land-based ICBM force and in the bomber force survives due to hardening and dispersal techniques. All U.S. ballistic missile submarines on-station and in transit are assumed to survive, the only casualties being those involved in underway replenishment or in CONUS ports (Charleston and Puget Sound). The assumptions are sensitive to the effectiveness of current MINUTEMAN and Bomber pre-launch survival programs, SLBM warning, Soviet ASW "trail" of U.S. SSBNs, Soviet air and missile defenses, and the attack scenario.

marines in their Northern and Pacific fleets in conjunction with air and surface units to form a protective screen for active defense of Soviet ballistic missile submarines against U.S. or NATO antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, while other Soviet SSNs attempt to "trail" or destroy U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarines prior to missile launch.

If and when the IOA ceiling of sixty-two boats or 950 SLBMs is reached, the Soviets might then wish to dismantle additional obsolescent launchers and create a land-mobile ICBM force of about sixty missiles to keep within the IOA total launcher ceiling—which makes any near-term deployment of SS-X-16 rather interesting—although like the SS-13 it may have more promise as a threat to western Europe as an IRBM with ICBM reserve capability. (The SS-13 is convertible to a mobile IRBM using its top two stages. It is not clear at this writing whether SS-X-16 has similar characteristics aside from mobility.)

Using this kind of near-maximum exploitation of the permissive "addition plus addition-by-replacement" provisions of the IOA, the Soviets could probably acquire a strategic-coercive capability within their strategic-nuclear forces within the IOA ceiling of 2,359 launchers plus some 100 to 200 strategic bomber and tanker aircraft—including the BACKFIRE—by the end of 1977. (This does not include additional strategic throw weight potential available to their extensive medium bomber force with added aerial refuelling or advanced basing.) A force of the kind estimated to be available to the Soviets at that time could include 1,102 "light" fixed-silo ICBMs (SS-11, SS-13 or MIRVed SS-X-17 and SS-X-19), 313 "heavy" fixed-silo ICBMs (SS-9 or MIRVed SS-X-18), 60 mobile ICBMs (SS-X-16, possibly some MIRVed), and 884 SLBMs on 62 ballistic missile submarines (560 1300 nm SS-N-6 on 35 Yankee boats plus 324 SS-N-8 on 27 Delta boats with some SS-N-8 possibly MIRVed).[13]

Changing Soviet Diplomatic Posture

The attainment by the Soviets of a credible strategic-nuclear superiority by means of a strategic-coercive capability could affect the defense posture of the U.S. in major areas. U.S. strategic force growth and survival programs would have to be accelerated (including the possible addition of increased capability to destroy Soviet hard targets and undersea forces). Any erosion in our deterrent credibility could undermine the nuclear guarantee to NATO and exacerbate existing tensions within the Alliance. West Germany in particular would have grave political anxieties about a NATO with a less-than-unmistakable U.S. nuclear commitment to secure her eastern frontier against a Soviet/Pact thrust. One can safely assume that the Soviets are already counting on these kinds of pressures to work in their favor at the eleven-nation MURFAAM (Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures—formerly called MBFR by NATO) negotiations at Vienna over central European, NATO and opposing Warsaw Pact force levels.

Given recent evidence of their strategic force development, the Soviets are presenting a growing challenge to the U.S. Their politico-military leadership (CPSU Chairman Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, and recent *Politburo* member and Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko) has maintained and continues to maintain a steady course towards attaining strategic superiority over the U.S. This course was charted by balancing Soviet nuclear and conventional strength for local, theater, and global operations—a characteristic they lacked at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The outcome of that event was too costly in Soviet prestige for them to risk any such repetition without adequate preparations. Thus, the latest Soviet gambit in the Middle East might well be their first in a continuing series of tests against U.S. power and prestige, utilizing their "new look" in balanced military capability.

It also appears from recent Soviet actions that they will continue to pursue what to the U.S. appears to be "détente" diplomacy, so long as it promises to produce the political "preconditions" which they have traditionally deemed necessary for their security—one cardinal rule of which is not to be faced with threats on two fronts (from the Peoples Republic of China and NATO with a U.S. nuclear presence in Western Europe). Thus, to the Soviets, "*ostpolitik*" and "détente" are important, but for highly peculiar reasons basic to Soviet geopolitical and military strategy. To the U.S., "détente" meant braking worldwide strategic competition in arms and channelling this into mutual cooperation on certain issues. The wide applicability which many leading U.S. political spokesmen are currently expecting from "détente" is typified by the remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, after returning from a European tour in July 1973:

> [Given its] difficulties with the Peoples Republic of China, it is not far-fetched to surmise that the Soviet Union has, as it has been described, a 'desperate' urgency for cooperation with the United States.[14]

In the wake of recent events in the Middle East, there is little reason to suppose that, in fact, the Soviets are bargaining from "desperation"—indeed their approach to bargaining as a separate activity from "negotiations" is very sophisticated—not having to be responsive to domestic political opinion. What is revealed is that the Soviets are continually *bargaining* on points where the "preconditions" are already weighted in their favor, while for psychological reasons, desiring to *negotiate* over a very wide range of issues with the West. The final bargaining at SALT I produced an IOA with strategic force ceilings just high enough to permit the Soviets to conclude ongoing programs and begin others.

But is IOA consistent with the long-run pursuit of strategic stability between the two sides? We have already referred to the asymmetries in perception between the U.S. and the Soviets regarding their security. These differences make complex the ferreting out of intentions which neither SALT I nor any possible SALT II can control.[15] While the parameters of East-West confrontation have changed to include more powers, the importance of confrontation —as far as the Soviet Union is concerned—is undiminished as a tool of policy. Realizing this, it is neither unthinkable nor untenable that strategic nuclear war might arise from confrontations where U.S. and Soviet forces are not directly opposed, and that once underway, each side will try to come out ahead, whatever the cost. In these two respects, the Soviets appear to be "thinking the unthinkable."

NOTES

NOTES

1. Excerpts from the letter of CPSU Chairman Brezhnev to President Nixon of October 24, 1973 which threatened consideration of unilateral measures should the U.S. refuse to join the USSR in a peace-keeping operation are contained in an article in the *Washington Post*, November 28, 1973, pp. A-1, A-35.

2. For a story on introduction of SCUD missiles into Egypt under Soviet control see *Washington Post*, November 21, 1973, p. A-1. The "B" version of SCUD has a nominal range of 185 miles and is nuclear-or-conventional capable. The article speculated that this was introduced during the war to counterdeter the Israelis from pre-emption with their JERICHO 280 mile range missile, also thought to be nuclear-capable. The "counter-deterrent" theory has major failings in not explaining how Israel would (a) need JERICHO when her armies began to repel Egypt, Syria, and their allies, or (b) *not* fail to use it regardless of the Soviet tactical nuclear threat in Egypt if it could make the difference between survival and annihilation. The JERICHO is currently in production but deployment plans are not known as of this writing. I discussed possible Soviet and Arab motives for a Middle East nuclear deterrent shortly after the Six-Day War, see Lewis A. Frank, "Nasser's Missile Program," *Orbis*, Vol. XI No. 3, Fall 1967, pp. 746–757.

3. Presidential quote from "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace," *The President's Report to the Congress*, May 3, 1973, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 9, No. 19, May 14, 1973, p. 609.

4. Text of the "Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" of May 26, 1972 in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1973*, New York, Humanities Press: 1973, pp. 29–30.

5. See "Statement of U.S. Delegation, May 20, 1972" in Congressional Quarterly, *The Power of the Pentagon*, Washington, CQ: 1972, p. 108.

6. Quote from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger*, 93rd Congress, 1st session, Washington, GPO: 1973, Part I of II, p. 232.

7. *Washington Post*, December 1, 1973, p. A-1.

8. *International Defense Review*, Vol. 6, No. 5, October 1973 "International Defense Digest" section. The SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 may be competing missile designs to replace SS-11.

9. For an interesting discussion of the post-Cuban Crisis strategic "debate" and an evolution of their attitudes towards nuclear war see John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," *USSI Report 73-1*, Washington, United States Strategic Institute: 1973, pp. 1–6. General Talensky's "Thoughts on Past Wars," *International Affairs*, No. 5, 1965 regarded overreliance on thermonuclear war strategy as "an illusion" and touched off a brief period of speculation in the West that the USSR might be downgrading the relative importance of nuclear war-waging capability to concentrate on conventional improvements. This speculation halted after wider public disclosure of Soviet efforts in strategic programs such as the 1965 Moscow parade and the phasing-in of their GALOSH ABM system. For a majority view and a direct reply to Talensky see Lt. Col. E. Rybkin, "On the Nature of World Rocket Nuclear War" translated by William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, Norman, U. of Oklahoma Press: 1968, pp. 101–115.

10. Throw weight estimates from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 1972*, London, IISS: 1973, p. 17. U.S. launcher and bomber totals from IISS, *The Military Balance 1973–1974*, London, IISS: 1973, p. 2. Soviet SLBMs on "noisy" diesel submarines are generally excluded from estimations of Soviet strategic capability. USSR launcher, bomber, and attack submarine totals based on the *Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer*, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff delivered before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, March 26, 1973, p. 6. The U.S. SAC bomber throw weight advantage could also be reduced by Soviet deployment of their variable-geometry BACKFIRE bomber ahead of the U.S. B-1. BACKFIRE is currently being flight-tested. Neither the B-1 nor the Navy's 4000 nm TRIDENT SLBM and boat system is planned to enter the strategic force prior to 1978 and throw weight estimates provided do not include these weapons. The lead TRIDENT boat with 24 launch tubes will be available for deployment in 1978 according to the congressional testimony of Rear Adm. R. Y. Kaufman, program coordinator for TRIDENT; see U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Dept. of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, "Dept. of Defense Appropriations for 1974," *Hearings*, 93rd Congress, 1st session, Washington, GPO: 1973, part 6 of 10, p. 896. For a discussion of the B-1 bomber development program see the September 1973 congressional testimony of Lt. Gen. W. A. Evans, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development in *Hearings*, op. cit., part 7, pp. 976–985.

11. The USSR could deliver about 5.3 million lbs. of nuclear throw weight against CONUS targets in a massive first-strike utilizing 75 per cent of its strategic forces, assuming a conservative weapon system reliability of 0.80.

12. If a "nominal" Soviet ICBM can deliver twice the throw weight of their present SS-N-6 SLBM, a current withheld force could consist of 2.2 million lbs. throw weight including 1.7 million lbs. on land in 300 to 350 very hard ICBM silos and one or two squadrons of dispersed strategic bombers plus 0.5 million lbs. in 20 to 25 SS-N-6 or SS-N-8 carrying YANKEE- or DELTA-class ballistic missile submarines. Given this kind of exchange scenario, some of the 313 heavy SS-9's (1 @ 25 MT or 3 @ 5–10 MT) could be withheld for a follow-up bargaining threat. The author assumes that present U.S. TRIAD forces have sufficient warning to go into a fully generated alert including bomber dispersal to satellite bases.

13. The estimated ICBM total reflects the probable phase-out of 209 old (pre1964) SS-7/SS-8 launchers in accordance with general guidelines of the agreements, plus 60 additional SS-13 light ICBMs. The 750 Soviet M/IRBMs and U.S. owned PERSHING/LANCE/ and SERGEANT tactical nuclear missiles stationed in West Germany and Italy are not included in the IOA.

14. Quote from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "European Reactions to the Soviet-United States Détente," *Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, July 23, 1973, Washington, GPO: 1973, p. 1.

15. For additional discussion of the side-effects of SALT I and some suggested negotiating revisions for SALT II see Arthur G. B. Metcalf, "SALT II—Some Principles," STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer 1973, pp. 2–6.

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VI - 25 JAAR COMECON

1. Met name als tegenwicht gecreëerd tegen het Marshallplan van Europese economische samenwerking, waarvoor de VS de fondsen beschikbaar stelden en opgericht in januari 1949, vormde de Comecon het eerste formele verbond van de SU en haar satellieten als staten. Deelneming aan een "continentaal" gemeenschappelijk reconstructieplan zou ook de SU tot "Marshallland" hebben gemaakt, doch de poging ook de SU voor een Europees plan te interesseren mislukte toen deelneming door Molotov werd afgewezen. Oorspronkelijk profileerde de Raad voor Wederzijdse Economische Hulpverlening (Comecon) zich slechts als een handelsorganisatie. Eerst na 1956 kregen de economische doestellingen (specialisatie en coördinatie) van de instelling prioriteit, waartoe in het jaar 1959 een Statuut werd aanvaard. Niet opmerkelijk, omdat zulks inherent is aan de communistische aard van de instelling, is dat in het Statuut noch in enig Comecon-dokument de term "politieke integratie" als zodanig voorkomt. Het Statuut maakt slechts in algemene zin van coördinatie van nationale plannen en samenwerking gewag en het enige Comecon-dokument waarin de wijze van integratie aan de orde wordt gesteld, n.l. de "Basisprincipes van de internationale socialistische arbeidsverdeling" werd eerst in december 1961 goedgekeurd. In het bijzonder werd hier de noodzaak van het opstellen van onderling op elkaar afgestemde plannen benadrukt en in veel mindere mate de werkelijk coördinatie van nationale economische plannen.

2. In het jaar 1962 zocht Chroesjtsjow aan te sturen op oprichti van een supranationale planningsinstantie, welke met de volmacht zou moeten worden bekleed gemeenschappelijke plannen voor de gehele Comeco regio op te stellen en met beslissingsbevoegdheid op organisatorisch terrein. Dit concept ging tegen de geest van Artikel I van het Statuut in, dat de samenwerking geheel gericht doet zijn op de ontwikkeling van de nationale economieën en deze samenwerking (althans op papier) baseert op eerbiediging van de soevereiniteit en de nationale belangen van elke lidstaat. Nadat met name Roemenië op nationalistische en economische gronden hardnekkig verzet had geboden werd het supranationale planningsconcept losgelaten en richtte men zich op het werk van de zgn "Permanente Commissies", opgericht om ontwikkelingen in bepaalde industriële sectoren te coördineren, en coördinatie van de economische

plannen van de

plannen van de Comecon-landen (i.h.b. buitenlandse handel) voornamelijk op basis van bilaterale consultaties. Deze ontwikkeling kenmerkte de periode tussen 1966 en 1970. Ook bij de voorbereiding van de vijfjarenplannen over 1971 - 1975 werd dit proces, waarbij de nadruk op bilaterale industriële samenwerking en co-productie kwam te liggen, voortgezet.

3. Op de 25ste zitting van de Comecon-raad in juli 1971 in Boekarest hechtten de lidstaten hun goedkeuring aan een "veelomvattend integratieprogram", dat de organisatorische basis voor de economische samenwerking vastlegt: tal van nieuwe projecten en instituten die het "complexprogram" als middelen en wegen aangeeft om de "internationale socialistische" arbeidsverdeling voor alle deelnemers zo vruchtbaar mogelijk te maken. Compromissen terzake van het begrip integratie en de invoering van een "twee-fasen" integratieconcept openden de weg naar spoedige aanvaarding van dit program. Het bevat een opsomming van alle terreinen waarop tijdens de eerste fase van socialistische eenwording in de komende 15 à 20 jaar samenwerking tot stand zou moeten worden gebracht. Naast het Statuut vormt dit programma het belangrijkste document dat in de Comecon werd opgesteld. Het begrip "economische integratie" werd voor de eerste maal onder de doelstellingen genoemd, waar tot dan toe steeds van "economische samenwerking" werd gesproken. Niettemin draait het ook bij het onderhavige programma vooreerst alleen nog om uitbreiding van internationale economische samenwerking. Nadrukkelijk wordt gesteld dat de "socialistische economische integratie niet vergezeld gaat van supranationale organen" en dat geen land aan enig onderdeel van het program tegen zijn wil behoeft deel te nemen. Ook naar buiten heeft de Comecon-raad geen recht van alleenvertegenwoordiging. De doelstellingen van het program, dat een "kwalitatief nieuw stadium" heet in te luiden, laten zich als volgt rangschikken:

- versnelde ontwikkeling van productiekrachten;
- verhoging van economische efficiency;
- maximale groei van de arbeidsproductiviteit;
- verbetering van de structuur en uitbreiding van de produktie;
- invoering en toepassing van hoogontwikkelde technologie;

- bevrediging van behoefte

- bevrediging van behoeften op lange termijn aan brandstof, energie, grondstoffen, machinerie en uitrusting, voedsel en consumptiegoederen door rationeel gebruik van de hulpbronnen van de Comecon-landen;

- verhoging van de materiële en kulturele levensstandaard;

- geleidelijke nivellering van economische ontwikkelingsniveaus van partners (in dit kader laat de Comecon zich nu al door Cubanen en Mongolen prijzen);

- indirect: het consolideren van de defensie van de Comecon-landen.

4. Sedert de aanvaarding van het "complexprogram", dat een vrij soepele verdeling van produktietaken op alle niveaus brengt, is vooral op organisatorisch terrein (concrete samenwerkingsplannen) vooruitgang geboekt. Aan de oplossing van fundamentele kwesties van institutionele of hervormingen in de monetaire en financiële sector op het gebied van bepalingen omtrent prijzen, wisselkoersen en convertibiliteit bestaat i de SU weinig behoefte. De meerderheid van conservatieve leden, daarond de SU, redeneert dat op financieel terrein door de groeiende activitei van de Comecon-banken (IBEC en IIB) reeds aanzienlijke successen worde geboekt. In de Russische bejubeling van de Comecon-roebel, de zgn. tra ferabele roebel (betaalmiddel sedert 1964), wordt deze voorgesteld als "de meest betrouwbare internationale valuta". Houders van tegoeden in deze "collectieve valuta" kunnen er veelal echter alleen "zachte" produkten, goederen die geen gerede aftrek vinden, maar geen "harde" produkten, b.v. hoogwaardige machines, die overal binnen de Comecon-regic aftrek vinden, voor kopen. Met de oprichting van de IIB (Intern. Investeringsbank) in 1971 trad de transferabele roebel als verrekeningseenheid in het overwegend bilaterale handelsverkeer tussen de Comecon-landen echter buiten dit kader en bestrijkt thans ook het terrein van kapitaalsinvestering. De transferabele roebel wordt niet alleen meer d de Comecon-banken, maar ook door andere Comecon-instellingen gebruikt. Sedert januari 1974 heeft de bank een ontwikkelingsfonds dat de invlo van de Comecon in ontwikkelingslanden die daarvoor in politiek opzich geëogend worden bevonden te verhogen. Onder de op basis van het "complexprogram" inmiddels ontplooide initiatieven zijn de volgende van bijzonder belang:

<u>- de oprichting van</u>

- de oprichting van de IIB;

- het besluit voor de aanleg van nieuwe pijpleidingen, kabelverbindingen en de bouw van nieuwe kerncentrales om uitbreiding te geven aan bestaande gezamenlijke energiesystemen;

- akkoord tussen zes lidstaten betreffende de bouw van een cellulosecomplex in de SU (Ust-Ilimsk);

- exploitatie van olie- en aardgasreserves in de SU; verhoging van gas-, hout-, cellulose- en papierleveranties aan Bulgarije in ruil voor Bulgaarse deelneming aan verdere uitbreiding van deze produkties in de SU;

- twee multilaterale akkoorden voor gezamenlijke planning van bep. typen van produktie; een multilateraal akkoord betr. specialisatie en industriële samenwerking in de glasindustrie, de ceramische industrie en op het gebied van de produktie van vrachtwagens, tractoren en landbouwmachines en op het terrein van containerisering;

- tal van industeriële specialisatie- en samenwerkingsakkoorden en verschillende wetenschappelijk- technologische. Oprichting van een dertigtal coördinatie-centra, waarbij moet worden opgemerkt dat de gezamenlijke research vooralsnog meer beperkt lijkt te blijven tot randgebieden zonder direct betrekking te hebben op de centrale problemen van op wetenschappelijke research aangewezen industrieën;

- een begin van coördinatie van de vijfjarenplannen der lidstaten voor het tijdvak 1976 - 1980 en hun economische plannen op lange termijn (1976 - 1990). In dit kader zullen de lidstaten in hun nationale economische plannen aangeven op welke materiële en financiële basis zij de integratietaken zullen vervullen;

- oprichting van het Comité voor planningssamenwerking en uitbreiding van de vroegere permanente commissie voor wetenschappelijk-technische samenwerking tot een Comecon-comité.

5. Het Comecon-

5. Het Comecon-integratieprogram bevat weinig specifieks over d kwestie van de externe economische relaties. Het belangrijkste dat op dit punt naar voren is gebracht is de verklaring dat "de leden van de Comecon hun buitenlands beleid zullen coördineren in het belang van d normalisering van de internationale handel en economische betrekkinge De algemene indruk bestaat dat op zijn minst de basis is gelegd voor meer eendrachtige houding tegenover de EEG. Het program voorziet even niet in een versterkt Comecon-secretariaat. De Secretaris-Generaal va instelling N. Faddeew heeft verklaard dat het akkoord van de Comecon met Finland (1973), in het kader waarvan een "samenwerkingscommissie" het leven is geroepen, tevens tot voorbeeld kan strekken om de samenwe king tussen landen met verschillend economisch en politiek bestel te regelen. Wat voorts tot voor kort de aard van de externe betrekkingen de Comecon-landen betreft, dient opgemerkt te worden dat de staathande landen van het Oostblok export (en met name die naar het Westen) niet als een factor van economische ontwikkeling per se beschouwden, maar u sluitend als een middel om essentieel geachte importen te betalen. Imp ten dienden hoofdzakelijk tekorten in bepaalde vitale sectoren van de economie te conpenseren, crises die uit planningsfouten dreigden voort vloeien te bezweren ofwel zij waren een middel om goederen te verwerve die in andere Comecon-landen niet vervaardigd konden worden. Thans eve trachten de Comecon-landen in toenemende mate de technologische kloof met het Westen te vernauwen door de import van kapitaalgoederen en knc sterk te doen toenemen en wordt deze influx van technologie voor bepaa industriële sectoren van beslissende betekenis geacht. De Oost-Europes lidstaten van de Comecon, wellicht met uitzondering van de DDR, lancee zo plannen voor economische samenwerking met Westerse landen op <u>bilate</u> basis, zulks voornamelijk op puur economische overwegingen. Het is dit streven om Westers kapitaal en Westerse technologie ter bevordering va de industriële ontwikkeling in Oost-Europa aan te trekken dat ook de aanzet gaf om de export van deze landen te herstructureren, straffe ha delspatronen te wijzigen en verschillende vormen van economische en in dustriële samenwerking met Westerse staten en ondernemingen op gang te brengen. Ook de SU heeft haar <u>bilaterale</u> betrekkingen met Westelijke l den aanzienlijk uitgebreid. De nadruk is daarbij komen liggen op weten schappelijke en technologische samenwerking en op bilaterale langlopen raamakkoorden. Daarenboven hebben de Russen hun activiteiten op andere

<u>economische terreinen</u>

economische terreinen opgevoerd. In toenemende mate worden pogingen in het werk gesteld zich op de Westerse markten niet alleen in het kader van het eigenlijke handelsverkeer te presenteren, maar ook b.v. op het terrein van de verkoop van patenten en licenties, verzekering e.d.. Ook is de SU in het kader van haar bankactiviteiten aktiever in het Westen gaan opereren. De centrale Westerse behoefte aan energie en grondstoffen en de groeiende Sowjet-behoefte aan technologie om de grondstoffenreserves in de SU te exploiteren zijn twee "complementaire" factoren die de ontwikkeling van grotere Oost-West-projekten, naar het voorkomt, slechts zullen bevorderen.

6. In juni jl. vond in Sofia de 28ste zitting van de Comecon en zo tevens de viering van de 25e verjaardag van de instelling plaats: "De gemeenschap van de Comecon-lidstaten vormt de meest dynamisch zich ontwikkelende regio ter wereld", meende secretaris Faddeew. Momenteel nemen de Comecon-landen, zo claimde hij, ongeveer 33% van 's-werelds industriële produktie, vergeleken met 18% in het jaar 1950, voor hun rekening. Hij benadrukte dat internationale ontspanning geleid had tot uitbreiding van wederzijds voordelige economische betrekkingen tussen de Comecon-landen en de West-Europese en andere economische ontwikkelde kapitalistische landen: "Trouw aan de beginselen van vreedzame coëxistentie wensen de socialistische landen met deze landen grootscheepse economische betrekkingen op lange termijn zonder enige discriminatie of ongelijkheid". Een groot aantal van de moeilijkheden in de organisatie en de ontwikkeling van samenwerking in de Comecon werd door hem geweten aan de "arme economische basis" vanwaaruit de communistische opbouw had moeten starten. Van een regionale organisatie was de Comecon dan nu een "internationale instelling geworden, waarvan negen socialistische landen van drie continenten lid zijn". Kennelijk moeten Mongolië en Cuba hier als statussymbolen fungeren. In de redevoering van premier Kosygin werden bij deze gelegenheid alle registers van het "socialistische internationalisme" opengezet, de toverformule die - naast het beginsel van gelijke rechten en soevereiniteit - naar Kosygins overtuiging verklaart "waarom er in onze gemeenschap geen vertrouwenscrises, geen ideële crises, geen botsingen tussen tegengestelde belangen of concurrentiestrijd voorkomen". In de betrekkingen van de Comecon-landen zijn de nationale en internationale belangen van de lidstaten harmonieus verenigd. Wat moeilijk te plaatsen in dit kader van een Comecon-zitting met Cubaanse en Mongoolse vertegenwoordigers en ook Joegoslavische sprekers was Kosygins

uitweiden over het

uitweiden over het Pakt van Warschau. Hij verklaarde: "In al deze jaren is de gezamenlijke inspanning van de landen van de socialistische gemeenschap gericht geweest op het waarborgen van de meest gunstige externe voorwaarden voor de opbouw van socialisme en communisme en voor de vreedzame creatieve arbeid van onze volkeren. Deze taak wordt met succes door het Verdrag van Warschau ten uitvoer gelegd, waarin onze landen hun krachten verenigen in de strijd om hun politieke, economische en defensieve posities in de wereld te versterken, ten behoeve van internationale ontspanning en versterking van de vrede en veiligheid in Europa en in de hele wereld. De opbouwende en doorslaggevende rol van de socialistische gemeenschap bij het versterken van de vrede bleek opnieuw op de vergadering van het Politiek Consultatief Comité van de WP-staten in april. De resultaten van deze conferentie zijn van bijzondere betekenis voor de verdere versterking van de verbondenheid van de socialistische gemeenschap en voor versterkte coördinatie van stappen van de socialistische staten op het internationaal toneel". - Wat deze excursie in elk geval erg duidelijk maakt is de Sowjet-behoefte de link tussen Comecon en WP een karakter van grote hechtheid te geven.