



2004001926

ARCHIEF

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdienst

Defensie

Bezoekadres.

Frederikkazerne, Gebouw 32
van der Burchlaan 31

Postadres:

MPC 58 B

Postbus 20701

2500 ES Den Haag

www.defensie.nl

Aan Hoofd van de Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst
Hoofd Bureau Veiligheid en Integriteit
[Redacted]
Dr. H. Colijnlaan 341
2283 XL Rijswijk

Datum 30 JAN. 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS/2004001926
Onderwerp Dhr Al Kaisi

Telefoon (070) [Redacted]

Fax (070) [Redacted]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 36 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 en conform de in het convenant met de IND vastgelegde afspraken van wederzijds informeren, melding van het volgende:

Tijdens de uitvoering van de wettelijke taken van de MIVD heeft de dienst de beschikking gekregen over gegevens waaruit blijkt dat [Redacted], thans verblijvend in [Redacted] van oktober 2001 tot en met mei / juni 2003 [Redacted]

Ik ga ervan uit u aldus voldoende te hebben geïnformeerd. Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich vanzelfsprekend te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst

B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor



2004009253

Defensie

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdienst
Afdeling Juridische Zaken

Bezoekadres:
Frederikkazerne, Building 32
van der Burchlaan 31
Postadres:
MPC 58 B
Postbus 20701
2500 ES Den Haag
www.defensie.nl

Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[REDACTED]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 24 mei 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS2004009253
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht ICTY

Geachte [REDACTED]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten. Een en ander is weergegeven in bijgevoegd Nederlands- en Engelstalig ambtsbericht ten behoeve van het International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Ik verzoek u vriendelijk het ambtsbericht door te geleiden naar het ICTY.


Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst


B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

Ministerie van Defensie

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Defensie

Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 19 JUL 2004
Ons kenmerk 012004013148
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht onderzoek [redacted]

Telefoon (070) [redacted]
Fax (070) [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]


Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten. Tijdens een debriefing op 1 maart 2004 in het kader van een uitzending naar Irak heeft de korporaal der mariniers [redacted] een verklaring gegeven die mogelijk van belang kan zijn voor het onderzoek door het Openbaar Ministerie naar [redacted]

Betrokkene verklaart tijdens de debriefing onder meer dat [redacted]
[redacted]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst



B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor



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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 30 JULI 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS 2004013971
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [redacted]

Telefoon (070) [redacted]
Fax (070) [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten. Uit [redacted] waarvan de betrouwbaarheid mij is gebleken, is informatie naar voren gekomen over [redacted] de heer [redacted]

[redacted]

In het licht van het bovenstaande en gelet op de spoedeisendheid van onderliggende zaak verzoek ik u mij zo spoedig mogelijk op de hoogte te stellen van uw beslissing inzake strafrechtelijke maatregelen/onderzoek ten aanzien van [redacted]. Aangezien het in casu informatie betreft die ook van belang is voor de veiligheid van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht en bondgenoten [redacted] zullen de gegevens aan vertegenwoordigers aldaar worden verstrekt. Daar het gaat om gegevens van strafrechtelijke aard zal van de beslissing van het Openbaar Ministerie ten aanzien van betrokkene bij de verstrekking melding worden gemaakt.

Datum

Ons kenmerk **Dis/**

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

~~Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst~~

F. Dedden

Generaal-majoor

5

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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[REDACTED]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 06 AUG. 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS2004014394
Onderwerp Aanvulling Ambtsbericht

Geachte [REDACTED]

In aanvulling op het gestelde in mijn ambtsbericht d.d. 30 juli 2004 treft u hierbij de bij de MIVD bekend zijnde persoonsgegevens aan:

Naam: [REDACTED]
Adres: [REDACTED]
Geboortedatum: [REDACTED]
Identiteitsbewijsgegevens: [REDACTED]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (wnd)


K.A.C. Hermesen
Commandeur



2004014394

Defensie

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

12 AUG. 2004

Datum
Ons kenmerk DIS2004013971
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [redacted]

Telefoon (070) [redacted]
Fax (070) [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten.

Uit betrouwbare bron is mij gebleken dat [redacted] de heer [redacted], mogelijk betrokken is geweest bij [redacted]

Bijgevoegd treft u tevens een afschrift van het identiteitsbewijs van betrokkene aan.

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst

[Signature]
G. Dedden
Generaal-majoor

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

Defensie

Ministerie van **Defensie**

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 3 september 2004

Ons kenmerk

DIS2004016181

Onderwerp

Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten.

Uit een gesprek met [redacted] is informatie naar voren gekomen over [redacted]

De bron heeft betreffende informatie verkregen via [redacted]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, plv.

K.A.C. Hermesen
Commandeur



2004016181

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 3 september 2004

Ons kenmerk DIS 2004016182

Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]

In navolging op mijn ambtsbericht van 3 september 2004 (DIS200416181) doe ik u op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van het volgende.

De in bovengenoemd ambtsbericht genoemde [redacted]
zijn volgens [redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

In bijlage bij dit ambtsbericht treft u de visitekaartjes met daarop de functie en overige gegevens van betrokkenen aan.

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, plv.


K.A.C. Hermans
Commandeur



2004016182

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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[REDACTED]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 3 september 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS2004016183
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [REDACTED]

Geachte [REDACTED]

In navolging op mijn ambtsbericht van 3 september 2004 (DIS200416181) doe ik u op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van het volgende.

De in bovengenoemd ambtsbericht vermelde zakenrelatie [REDACTED] betreft:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Betrokkene is [REDACTED]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, plv.

K.A.C. Hermesen
Commandeur



2004016183

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[redacted]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 3 september 2004
Ons kenmerk DIS2004016184
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [redacted]

Geachte [redacted]

In navolging op mijn ambtsbericht van 3 september 2004 (DIS200416181) doe ik u op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van het volgende.

Op 2 september 2004 heeft [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] er
[redacted].

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, plv.

K.A.C. Hermise
Commandeur




2004016184

Defensie

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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Afdeling Juridische Zaken

Bezoekadres:
Frederikkazeme, Building 32
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Postadres:
MPC 58 B
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2500 ES Den Haag
www.defensie.nl

Aan De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
[REDACTED]
Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 13 SEP. 2004
Ons kenmerk Dis/2004016482
Uw kenmerk MIVD230704
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [REDACTED]

Telefoon (070) [REDACTED]
Fax (070) [REDACTED]


Geachte [REDACTED],

Ingevolge uw verzoek d.d. 26 juli 2004, maak ik hierbij op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten. Een en ander is weergegeven in bijgevoegd ambtsbericht ten behoeve van het Team Internationale Misdriften van de Nationale Recherche. Ik verzoek u vriendelijk het ambtsbericht door te geleiden naar de zaaksofficier, mr. [REDACTED]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst


B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor



2004016482

Defensie

Ministerie van Defensie

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Bezoekadres:

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MPC 58 B
Postbus 20701
2500 ES Den Haag
www.defensie.nl

Aan Landelijk Parket Openbaar Ministerie
t.a.v. [REDACTED]
Postbus 395
3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 13 SEP. 2004
Ons kenmerk Dis/2004016482
Uw kenmerk RL 5010
Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake de heer [REDACTED]

Telefoon (070) [REDACTED]
Fax (070) [REDACTED]

Geachte [REDACTED]

Naar aanleiding van uw verzoek d.d. 19 juli 2004 en het daar bij gevoegde memo met vragen van de heer [REDACTED], senior rechercheur tactiek van de Nationale Recherche maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten.

De naam [REDACTED] (verschillende spellingswijzen) is de naam van een stam (-verband). De leden en substammen van de [REDACTED] stam bewonen voornamelijk de westelijke woestijngebieden in Irak. Er zijn familiale betrekkingen met stammen in Jordanië en Syrië. De stam was sterk verbonden met het regime van Saddam Hoessein, met name op economisch gebied, maar vanuit de [REDACTED] stam heeft in 1995/1996 ook een poging tot een revolutie plaatsgevonden.

- Omdat niet geheel duidelijk is wat voor opleidingskamp bedoeld wordt, kan hierop slechts een algemeen antwoord volgen. Hilla is een provinciehoofdstad en kende een garnizoen. Bij de militaire eenheden onder dat garnizoen vonden naar alle waarschijnlijkheid algemene militaire opleidingen plaats. Er zijn geen gegevens bekend over specifieke opleidingskampen in Hilla.
- Onderstaande gegevens over Irakese uniformen zijn gedateerd (1990), maar het zijn de enige beschikbare gegevens.

Infanterie:

Zwarte of kaki kleurige baretten. Zomerkleding is kaki en winterkleding groen.

Commando's: (Maga'ir)

Groene baretten. Kakikleurig gevechtspak met groene vlekken erop. Verder een mouwembleem met de woorden "Al-Mughawar" hetgeen Commando betekent. Ze dragen verder een rood koord.

Troepen speciale opdrachten.

Scharlakenrode baretten met een para embleem. Er worden twee soorten kakikleurige uniformen gedragen met een zwart of geel vlekkenpatroon. Op het gevechtspak wordt een rood schouderkoord gedragen, zwarte schoenen en een para-embleem op de rechter borst.

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

Artillerie:

Blauwe baretten.

Luchtmacht:

Licht blauwe baret met een halve wing embleem. Verder blauwe broeken met een lichtblauw shirt.

Marine:

Licht blauwe baret. Witte uniformen en in de winter blauw.

Militaire Politie:

Licht rode baret. In de zomer licht kakikleurige uniformen en in de winter groen. Er wordt op het uniform een witte riem met witte handschoenen gedragen. Een wit holster met pistool wordt aan de linkerzijde gedragen en van de rechter heup naar de linkerschouder een witte schouderriem. Zwarte schoenen, een wit koord met een uiteinde in de linkerborstzak. Er is nog een wit koord dat is bevestigd aan het rechter epaulet en met het andere uiteinde aan het pistoolholster. Op de deuren van hun voertuigen staan de woorden "INTARIYAT ASKARI" of de letters I.A. hetgeen militaire politie betekent.

Legerkorpsen:

Een andere kleur koord kan ook het betreffende Legerkorps weergeven. Zo had vroeger het zesde Legerkorps een paars koord. Het vierde Legerkorps heeft zwarte koorden met goudkleurige draden eromheen.


Republikeinse Garde:

De Republikeinse Garde draagt zwarte baretten en olijfgroene uniformen. Een Browning revolver wordt gedragen in een holster aan de riem. Het holster heeft versierde koorden die aan het shirt bevestigd zijn. Het shirt heeft lage zakken. Bruine schoenen, een rood schouderkoord en emblemen worden op de mouwen gedragen.

Andere gegevens over Irakese uniformen komen van open bronnen (www.globalsecurity.org). De gegevens uit die bronnen dateren van eind jaren '80. Met betrekking tot de Republikeinse Garde (RG) wordt daarin gesteld dat zij een driehoekige armepaulet droegen. Mogelijk dat diverse eenheden binnen de RG op die driehoek onderscheidende symbolen voerden, al is de lettercombinatie HJ dezerzijds niet bekend.

- Een deel van de RG was gelegerd in de Al-Tadji kazerne, net ten noorden van Bagdad.
- Een RG bataljon nr 7 met de naam "Wajibat" is dezerzijds niet bekend. Het dichtst in de buurt komen onderstaande twee eenheden van bataljonsgrootte:
 - 70^{ste} Tankregiment (15^e Brigade, Hammurabi Divisie RG) in Al-Tadji
 - "Al Wahdad" Tankregiment (10^e Brigade, Medina Divisie RG) in Suwayra (zuid van Bagdad)
- Er bestaat veel onduidelijkheid omtrent welke I&V diensten eind jaren negentig in Irak actief waren. Népotisme rondom Saddam Hoessein en zijn zonen, onderlinge rivaliteiten en wantrouwen zorgden er voor dat zij mogelijk zelf niet wisten hoe de diensten waren georganiseerd.

Dezerzijds werd onderstaand overzicht gehanteerd.



- Speciale Veiligheidsdienst Jihaz Amn al-Khass

Gevoegd in bijlage hetgeen in open bron (Jane's februari 2003) bekend werd gesteld over I&V diensten in Irak.

In aanvulling daarop is dezerzijds het onderstaande bekend:

Amn al Khass, de binnenlandse veiligheidsdienst, is na de oorlog met Iran opgericht. De voornaamste taak van deze dienst was de persoonlijke bewaking en bescherming van Saddam Hoessein. De dienst heeft in de loop der jaren een groot prestige opgebouwd. Tengevolge van dit prestige stond deze dienst aan de top van de hiërarchie binnen het Irakese veiligheidsapparaat. Mede hierdoor was de Amn al Khass ook in staat de gangen van de medewerkers van andere veiligheids- en inlichtingendiensten nauwgezet te volgen. Verder drukte de dienst elk teken van verzet tegen Saddam Hoessein genadeloos de kop in. De dienst is in 1991 actief betrokken geweest bij het neerslaan van de intifadah in Zuid-Irak. Volgens oppositiebronnen zijn na afloop van de intifadah meer dan 10.000 shiitische opstandelingen, in de gevangenis nabij Al Rathwaniah, om het leven gebracht. Verder zijn leden van deze dienst betrokken geweest bij de inname op 31 augustus 1996 van de Koerdische stad Arbil.


De dienst was vanouds bemand met personen die bijzonder loyaal waren aan Saddam Hoessein, vrijwel alle leden waren afkomstig uit die gebieden waar de Soennitische Arabieren in de meerderheid zijn. Een groot deel van hen was afkomstig uit de ██████████ stad. Na rekrutering ondergingen de nieuwe leden een harde fysieke opleiding van zes maanden, daarna volgden zij twee maanden een theoretische opleiding, waarin onderricht werd gegeven in de structuren van de diverse oppositiegroeperingen, de technieken van moordaanslagen, het gebruik van explosieven, de bescherming van strategische doelen (m.n. Saddams paleizen) en het werven van collaborateurs. Na de opleiding werd men geplaatst bij een van de vijf brigades van de Amn al-Khass. Leden van de Amn al-Khass droegen in het algemeen geen uniformen en/of rangonderscheidingstekens

De Al Amn al-Khass was vermoedelijk als volgt onderverdeeld:

- Administratieve tak: verantwoordelijk voor de algemene administratie, voedselverstrekking, huisvesting, financiën etc;
- Politieke tak: verzamelde informatie over personen die werden aangemerkt als vijanden van de Staat;

- Speciale tak: deze tak richtte zich op het eigen personeel met betrekking tot loyaliteit en voerde operaties uit tegen verdacht personeel van Al Khass;
- De brigade van Amn al Khass: de militaire vleugel van Amn al Khass. Deze eenheid was een snelle interventiemacht die nauw samenwerkte met de Speciale Republikeinse Garde.

De organisatie van de Jihaz Al Amn Al Khass was als volgt:



- Er zijn geen specifieke namen bekend van personeel van het JAK.
- Er was een opleidingskamp bij het meer van Al-Habanya, al zijn daar geen nadere gegevens over bekend.
- Het hoofdkwartier van de Mukhabarat (algemene veiligheidsdienst) stond inderdaad in de wijk Baladiyat in Bagdad.
- Er zijn dezerzijds geen gegevens bekend over een grijs gebouw nabij het hoofdkwartier van de Mukhabarat.
- Er zijn dezerzijds geen gegevens bekend over een "cel 2" van het JAK.
- Leden van het JAK dragen in het algemeen geen uniformen en rangonderscheidingstekens.
- Het is dezerzijds niet bekend hoeveel men bij het JAK verdiende.
- Er is dezerzijds geen informatie omtrent identiteitskaarten van Irakese geheime diensten beschikbaar.
- Het bericht van CBS ten aanzien van de archieven van de JAK is juist. De archieven zijn verspreid onder de Amerikanen, politieke partijen in Irak, w.o. de INC van Chalabi, een Koerdische politieke partij en privé personen. Zo af en toe worden zelfs delen van de JAK-archieven te koop aangeboden.


Ik ga er vanuit u aldus in voldoende mate te hebben geïnformeerd. Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke, positioned above the name and rank of the signatory.

J.S. Dedden
Generaal-majoor

Jane's Sentinel February 2003

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

TOTAL	STRENGTH
100,000 (estimate)	

Special Security Service (SSS)

The Special Security Service (SSS), or Amn al Khass (Hijaz Amn al Khass), is the premier Iraqi intelligence agency, controlled by Saddam's son Qusay and charged with protecting the president and suppressing any opposition to him. Being the most powerful of the security agencies in Iraq, it takes a supervisory role over all the other organisations in the intelligence/security field. The SSS played a key role in co-ordinating the drive to frustrate the efforts of UNSCOM to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). UNSCOM withdrew its personnel from Iraq in December 1998. During that month Saddam Hussein established a new system of four regional commands to exercise tighter control over the armed forces. As part of the system, the four regional commanders were only to receive instructions from Saddam himself, via the SSS. It is an indication of the degree of trust accorded by Saddam to the SSS that the organisation was given such a role. Meanwhile, the primary position of the SSS in the Iraqi security apparatus was not lost on Saddam's enemies - during the 'Desert Fox' offensive of December 1998, SSS facilities were among the prime targets of Coalition air strikes. In the summer of 2000, Saddam suspended the four commands, claiming the results of the "battle" with Coalition forces were in Iraq's favour, and that the four commands were no longer necessary.

The SSS was set up at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and the man charged with organising the agency and being its first head was Hussein Kamil, Saddam's ill-fated son-in-law. As Minister for Military Industrialisation, Kamil also headed Iraq's covert drive to build WMD. He used the resources of the SSS to run an extensive arms and technology procurement network, operating through a host of front companies. Kamil defected to Jordan in August 1995. He later returned home, unwisely believing guarantees that he would be unharmed, and was killed. The SSS is now answerable directly to Qusay, who is its commander-in-chief. It is seen as Qusay's own personal organisation, and has the power to investigate even members of other security/intelligence agencies.

Because of the sensitive nature of the work carried out by the SSS, and because members, in effect, constitute Saddam's praetorian guard, recruits are chosen with great care. The regime goes to extremes to ensure that nobody who can harm the president gets within reach of him. Recruits for the Amn al Khass normally have to be from a certain tribe or area noted for its loyalty to Saddam. A recruit should be either from Tikrit, Saddam's hometown, or Hawuija, about 25km to the north, or Samarra, about 35km to the south. Members of the Al Delaim tribe in the west of Iraq are also acceptable. In the early days of the SSS, in the period 1988-89, the strength of the agency was only about 1,000, but it quickly grew, with volunteers over 16 years being accepted, so long as they had an acceptable family/tribal background. There were reports in 1995 that Saddam had ordered a drive to recruit large numbers of new members - a sign, perhaps, of his growing paranoia and increasing concern for his own safety.

The Amn al Khass HQ is on Palestine Street, in Baghdad. Qusay has an office there, and visitors and formal delegations are received at this centre. However, much of the work of the Amn al Khass is organised from a much bigger building, a multi-storey office block near the Rashid Hotel, behind the Palace of Meetings. The vast majority of the members are based in Baghdad, with just two small offices in other cities, one in Basra and the other in Mosul. The SSS provides teams that guard Saddam around the clock. Some provide 'static' protection, specialising in guarding Saddam when he is present in any of his palaces around the country. Other teams specialise in 'mobile' protection to guard Saddam and his entourage when on the move.

Quite apart from providing static and mobile bodyguard services, the SSS also has another important function - to take a pro-active role in detecting and neutralising any threat to Saddam's security. This can involve operations against dissident elements both in Iraq and abroad. Agents of the SSS entered the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of that area on 31 August 1996. The SSS also has the power to investigate members of other Iraqi security/intelligence agencies. SSS members themselves are also kept under watch, for like other agencies of this type in Iraq, the SSS has a security section whose role is to ensure that its own operatives have total loyalty to Saddam and are not posing a threat to the Rais.

The SSS played an important role in the suppression of the Shi'a rebellion that followed the Gulf War. Iraqi opposition sources have claimed that up to 10,000 Shi'as were executed at a big prison complex built and maintained by the SSS near Saddam's large farm and palace at Al Ranighwania, about 26km south of Baghdad, and not far from Saddam International Airport. An Iraqi defector who was formerly an

intelligence man has said he was present during the mass executions, and that some of the prisoners were killed by being struck with mechanical diggers. The bodies are said to be in mass graves within the prison complex. The prison at Al Ranighwania is the main interrogation centre of the SSS.

The assassination attempt on Saddam's son Uday in December 1996, which left him crippled, is believed to have sent Shockwaves through the SSS, which is charged with protecting not only Saddam but also members of his immediate family. SSS agents immediately arrested Uday's bodyguards for interrogation. Ironically, the attack happened in the Mansour district of Baghdad, where Mukhabarat has its headquarters.

Among its many roles the SSS is responsible for recruiting personnel for the Republican Guard (RG), and to carry out exhaustive security checks on those recruited. It is also part of the role of the SSS to assist in the recruitment of suitably qualified staff for posts in the military industrial complex, which is overseen by the Military Industrialisation Organisation (MIO), and to carry out exhaustive security checks on those recruited. SSS men visit military camps of the regular army to recruit for the RG - they have also used these visits to recruit soldiers with engineering or other technical qualifications for MIO posts.

It emerged in 1999 that the SSS controls the special weapons handling units of Iraq's Chemical Corps (CC). The corps is responsible for Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal and because of the sensitive nature of the work of the corps, it comes not under military command but under the command of the SSS.

The main branches of the SSS are as follows:

Administration Branch

This deals with general administration, food supplies, salaries, buildings etc.

Political Branch

This branch gathers and analyses information and formulates scenarios for dealing with enemies of the state. The head is Major Nawfal Mahjoom al Tikriti. The branch keeps extensive computer files on all those citizens who ever came to the attention of the authorities as possible dissidents or subversives. These files are separate from the computerised criminal records held by the Ministry of the Interior. It is believed that the Political Branch includes the following:

- Public Opinion Unit. This euphemistically named unit deals essentially with psychological operations (psyops). One of its roles is to monitor what the people are thinking, and to disseminate rumours and reports that serve the purposes of the state.
- Operations unit. This unit, headed by Haji Zuhair al Tikriti, is in charge of operations against those perceived to be enemies of the state. (If an operation is being mounted against suspect members of the SSS, the operation comes under the aegis of the security unit of the Special Branch. See below.)

Special Branch.

Among the elements that come under the aegis of the Special Branch is the following:

- Security unit. This unit keeps watch on members of the SSS, to ensure that they are totally loyal to the regime.

Other units/operations/facilities:

- The Brigade of Amn al Khass. This rapid intervention force is the military unit of the SSS. If the SSS is involved in mounting a military-style operation, it could also call on the assistance of the Special Republican Guard.
- The National Security Council Joint Operations Room (JOR). The JOR, located at the Presidential Palace, is operated by members of Amn al Khass, and co-ordinates the operations of key security forces that maintain order in Baghdad. The deployment of these units is strictly controlled by the JOR, according to a daily schedule drawn up by the NSC.

The SSS Prison is in Hai al Tashriya, Baghdad. The officer in charge of the SSO prison is Hassan Khalid al Tikriti. The deputy head of the prison is Abbas Muhammad Hamed al Dulaimi.

The strength of the SSS is in the region of 5,000 officers and soldiers. They operate in plain clothes.

General Intelligence Directorate (GID)

Saddam Hussein's ruthless rise to power can be attributed partly to his grip on the security apparatus of the Ba'ath Party. In fact, the Mukhabarat has its origins in a tough, tightly organised security/intelligence unit that Saddam formed on behalf of the party between 1964 and 1966. This was the Jihaz al Khass (Special Apparatus) and it was made up of small armed cells composed of party hardliners who were given training in intelligence work. One of the roles of the group, known by the codename Jihaz al Haneen, was to collect information for Saddam about members of the party. After the Ba'ath took power in July 1968, Saddam expanded the role of the Jihaz, using the group, and the secret police, to ruthlessly suppress all opposition. By the early 1970s the Jihaz had been transformed into the Da'irat al Mukhabarat al Amah (General Intelligence Directorate - GID or Iraqi Intelligence Service - IIS), more often known as the Mukhabarat. (For a period, it was known euphemistically by the Orwellian-style title, Public Relations Bureau.) The first head of the GID was Sadoon Shaker, and Saddam's half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, later

to become an Iraqi diplomat in Geneva, also served as head. Another notable chief of the service was Sabr al-Duri. Being given the honour of being appointed head of Iraqi intelligence is no guarantee of survival in the regular purges of senior figures carried out by the paranoid Saddam regime. One head of the GID, Fadhil al Barak, was arrested on suspicion of assisting the Soviet Union's KGB, held in jail for two years under humiliating conditions, and finally executed in 1991. The head up to July 1997 was Staff Lieutenant General Manee Abd al Rashid. He was succeeded by Rafi Dabham al Tikriti, former Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey and a former head of the GID's Fourth Directorate, or Secret Service, a section dealing with covert intelligence operations at home and abroad. It was reported in October 1999 that al-Tikriti, a second cousin of Saddam, was executed after the Iraqi leader ordered an investigation into how details of secret arms deals between Iraq and Russia had been published in the West. A senior official in the intelligence service was said to have been identified as being responsible for the leak. The reports said that both he and al-Tikriti were then arrested. Al-Tikriti was executed, according to the reports, and it was presumed that the official met a similar fate.

The role of the GID is to collect domestic and foreign intelligence on matters to do with the security of the state, and to carry out operations at home and abroad against those considered to be a threat to state security. Its strength is about 4,000. GID HQ is located in a vast complex, surrounded by a wall popularly known as the Great Wall of China, in the Mansour district of Baghdad. US warships fired Tomahawk missiles at the centre on 27 June 1993, in retaliation for a GID plot to assassinate former President Bush while on a visit to Kuwait the previous April. The centre also came under attack during the 'Desert Fox' offensive of December 1998. Three Iraqi 'diplomats' arrested in Lebanon in 1994 for the murder of Iraqi dissident Sheikh Talib al Souhail were, in reality, members of the GID, according to Lebanese security sources. One of the more significant achievements of the GID was the detection of a coup attempt by the opposition group the Iraqi National Accord (INA) in the Summer of 1996.

Saddam Hussein's son Qusay, who heads the regime's security/intelligence apparatus, ordered Iraqi intelligence to step up activities against Iraqi dissidents abroad, according to a report in London's *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* newspaper on 7 December 2000. It was presumed that any such activity would primarily fall within the ambit of the Mukhabarat. The newspaper quoted an unnamed senior Iraqi official as saying that increasingly intelligence officers in Iraqi embassies abroad would concentrate on following Iraqi dissidents. The source claimed that as part of their 'cover', these intelligence officers often has nominal responsibilities as commercial, cultural or press attaches.

The GID was one of the agencies that took part in the concealment effort spearheaded by the Special Security Service to defeat the efforts of UNSCOM to detect and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The GID has also allegedly been used to oversee the detention of prisoners of war. In November 2001 two members of the Mukhabarat who defected to the West claimed that the service operated a secret underground detection centre at Salman Pak, about 30km south of Baghdad, where about 80 Kuwaiti prisoners of war continued to be held following the 1991 Gulf War.

There have been varying reports about the organisational structure of the GID. The estimated structure outlined below is based partly on a study of the different directorates within the GID drawn up by the dissident umbrella group, the Iraqi National Congress, and partly on material from other sources. Responsibilities and duties overlap between some sections or directorates of the GID.

Structure of the GID:

Directorate 1 (D1)

This is the private office, based in the GID's complex in Mansour, Baghdad, of the GID director, from where instructions and directives are issued. Sub-divisions include Secretariat, Audit, Salaries Reception and Appointments, Internal and External Co-ordination, and Security.

D2 Administration

Based at GID HQ in Mansour, this directorate looks after the general administration of the GID - the salaries of some personnel, buildings, archives and so on.

D3 Surveillance

This section, based in the GID training college in Baghdad, is responsible for the covert surveillance of suspects and even possible recruits. Sub-divisions include Mobile Surveillance (pursuit of target using cars); Foot Surveillance (shadowing a target on foot) and Static Surveillance (watching a premises from a kiosk, house or shop).

D4 Secret Service

Located at GID HQ, this is one of the most important of the GID directorates, and specialises in the gathering of intelligence through its agents at home and abroad. At home, the GID infiltrates agents into government departments, the Ba'ath Party, trade unions and other organisations, and abroad, it has agents in Iraqi embassies and under other cover. This directorate also seeks to infiltrate agents into the Iraqi opposition. The directorate has a number of offices, each specialising in the collection of intelligence concerning a particular country or region of the world. There are offices for Southern Asia, Turkey, Iran, America (North and South), Europe, Arab states, Africa and former Soviet Union. The Secret Service also

gets intelligence on foreign countries from the Al Hadi Project, the Iraqi agency responsible for SIGINT/ELINT.

D5 Counter Intelligence

This unit is responsible for countering the activities of those who would seek to carry out intelligence operations against Iraq. It is believed that there is a particular focus on the activities of Syrian intelligence, which appears to maintain quite an active espionage network in Iraq.

D6 GID Security

This section gathers information on the members of the Mukhabarat to ensure that they are totally loyal. It has members within all the departments of the GID, and has offices around the country. Reports are sent to the head of D6, who reports directly to the GID chief. D6 is also responsible for issuing ID papers, passports and other documentation to all GID personnel.

D7 Detention and Interrogation

This is one of the most feared sections of the Mukhabarat. Sometimes known as Office Seven, it handles the interrogation of suspects. Some interrogations are carried out at the many houses and buildings controlled by the Mukhabarat. However, the main interrogation centre is at al Haakimiya, a large building, or prison, on 52 Street in Baghdad, with three floors below ground level and several above. Prisoners are questioned here before being sent to the Revolutionary Courts for trial. Dissident sources have claimed that prisoners can literally be held for years at 52 Street if the Mukhabarat considers that the interrogation has not been successfully concluded. Office Seven maintains another major prison-cum-interrogation centre at Khandari, about 23km west of Baghdad. If a prisoner escapes the death penalty and is given a term of imprisonment by a Revolutionary Court, he will usually be sent to Iraq's main prison, in the Abughreib district of Baghdad.

Opposition sources say that Office Seven also carries out executions of prisoners in certain cases. Members of the Iraqi opposition umbrella group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) believe that a senior officer in the INC forces was executed by Office Seven after Iraqi forces overran a section of the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq on 31 August 1996. Major Ali Bahr Uloum was wounded in the fighting, taken away in an Iraqi army helicopter and never seen again.

D8 Forensics

This unit, staffed by highly-skilled engineers and scientists with good university degrees, operates laboratories for the examination of weapons and explosives. It keeps fingerprint files on all GID members, and performs a range of other specialist tasks, including the assembly of special cameras and radio communications equipment. It is thought that this unit may also be responsible for the preparation of materials such as explosives and poisons to be used in covert offensive operations.

D9 Secret Operations

This unit is responsible for sabotage and assassination operations. The unit carries out most of its work outside Iraq, in co-ordination with other GID directorates, and is seen as one of the most important sections of the GID.

D10 Legal Affairs

This unit looks after the legal affairs of the GID, and represents the agency in joint committees with other government departments and ministries. The unit also operates a court where prisoners of the GID may be tried.

D11 Accounts

This section handles the financial affairs and personnel salaries of all directorates, except D1.

D12 Electronic Surveillance

Personnel from this unit may be called in by other directorates to install covert video and audio surveillance equipment.

D13 Medical

This unit is charged with the medical care of GID personnel, and also with carrying out medical examinations on new recruits.

D14 Special Operations

Located at Salman Pak, 20km southeast of Baghdad, this is one of the biggest and most important of the GID directorates. D14 is responsible for special clandestine operations abroad, and for training agents for such missions. Agents preparing for such missions go to a special school. They attend language courses given by teachers fluent in the language of the country to which they are being sent. They are given detailed, general information about the country. They are also given training in the skills and techniques needed for the operation itself, whether it involves an assassination, planting a bomb, or sabotage. (Special six week courses in the use of letter bombs, car bombs and other terror tactics are given at a camp in Radwaniyah, according to a Mukhabarat instructor, Major Harbi Muaffaq al Jibouri, who defected in the mid-1990s.) D14 also undertakes joint operations with the militia of the Iranian dissident organisation, the Mujahideen e-Khalq, which is hosted by Iraq.

D15 Transport

This directorate is responsible for the GID's fleet of vehicles.

D16 Buildings

This directorate is responsible for the maintenance and repair of all GID buildings.

D17 National Security Institute

This is the college, located at Abughreib in the western suburbs of Baghdad, that trains high school and college graduates prior to entering the intelligence service as junior officers. High school graduates undertake a three year study course, while those with university or post-graduate degrees do an 18 months course. The college also features a supermarket that may be used by GID members.

D18 Iranian Affairs

This directorate has special responsibility for the Mujahideen e-Khalq, the dissident Iranian movement based in Iraq. (See D14.)

D19 Personnel Supervision

It is understood that this unit carries out surveillance on GID members, presumably in co-ordination with the security unit, D6.

D20 Printing

Responsibilities include the printing of books and leaflets, as well as the forging of documents such as passports.

D21 Residency

This unit monitors the residence permits of foreigners in Iraq.

D22 Protection

This unit is responsible for the personal security of senior GID officials and visiting dignitaries.

D23 Southern District

Based in Basra in southern Iraq, this unit is responsible for operations in that region, for monitoring events in countries bordering on southern Iraq and for infiltrating agents into these countries.

D24 Northern District

Based in Mosul and with an office in Kirkuk, this unit handles operations in northern Iraq and also in the Kurdish region. It has particular responsibility for infiltrating agents into the Kurdish opposition.

D25 Western District

Based in Ramadi, this directorate is responsible for operations in this region and also in Syria and Jordan, and for the recruitment of agents in those countries.

D26 Eastern District

Based in Karbala, the directorate is responsible for operations in this region.

D27 Engineering and Construction

This unit is in charge of the construction of buildings for the GID, including houses for senior officers.

D28 MIO Security

Located at Palestine Street, Baghdad, this unit has special responsibility for external security at all the buildings of the Military Industrialisation Organisation (MIO) which oversees Iraq's arms industry. The setting up of D28 was one of the panic measures taken by the regime following the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamel in August 1995.

Other Units:

Reports have emerged of other units within the GID. It is unclear if they come under the aegis of some of the above directorates, or whether they are independent. They are as follows:

Planning Office

This section collects and analyses information from all around the world, and works out possible scenarios affecting Iraq. The section makes use of overt sources, such as radio, satellite TV and newspapers.

Propaganda Office

This section fulfils the function of psychological warfare. Dissidents claim it sometimes disseminates false stories about attempted coups being smashed by Saddam, in order to make the regime look all-powerful; or the unit might generate stories in the media that make the perceived enemies of Iraq (for example the Kurds or Iran or King Hussein of Jordan) appear in a poor light. Dissidents also say the unit was behind the distribution of video footage showing how government forces smashed the Kurds/Shi'a uprising after the Gulf War. Other footage showed Saddam insulting and threatening various aides - presumably to convey an image of great power and ruthlessness.

Office of Guarding

This is the section that controls the armed, uniformed guards who protect the offices and installations of the Mukhabarat.

Brigade of Mukhabarat.

This is the military unit of the agency. It is a rapid intervention force, well-armed with light and semi-heavy weapons. (Apart from the Brigade of Mukhabarat, most members of the agency operate in plain clothes. However those working in administration in the agency's offices wear military uniform, but without insignia.)

Note: It is understood that above the level of the directorate, there is another echelon of command, the branch, or bureau. Sources say that there are three main branches of the GID - Administration Branch, Political Branch and the Special Bureau. Directorates that come under the aegis of the Political Branch are understood to include D4 Secret Service and D5 Counter-Intelligence as well as the Planning Office and the Propaganda Office. Directorates that come under the control of the Special Bureau are understood to include D7 Detention and Interrogation, and D14 Special Operations.

General Security Service (GSS)

The General Security Service (GSS), which is also known as Amn al Amm, the Secret Police or the General Security Directorate, monitors the daily lives of Iraqi citizens for signs of dissent. There is a GSS unit in every police station in Iraq. The GSS, which functions essentially as a political police force, also has its own separate buildings and offices. Apart from an internal security role, and the mission of suppressing insurrection, the GSS also deals with crimes such as smuggling and banditry. Many detectives from the anti-crime section of the civilian police were transferred to the GSS in the late 1980s. The headquarters of the GSS was formerly in the Bataween district of Baghdad. In 1990 the GSS moved to a new HQ in the al Baladiat area of the city, and the Bataween building is now the agency's main prison. The GSS HQ is located in the vast, heavily guarded complex encircled by a double wall and guarded by security personnel in watch towers. Guards also keep watch from trucks, mounted with machine guns, from around the complex.

The head of the GSS is an experienced intelligence man, Staff Major General Taha al Ahabbi. He previously headed the Military Security Service for two years, and also served as the head of the secret service section of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the *Mukhabarat*. Predictably, he comes from Saddam's home town of Tikrit.

The GSS was part of the civilian police force under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior until the late 1970s when the unit was hived off and organised as a separate agency responsible directly to the Presidential Palace. Although some of its previous functions have been taken over by other agencies, the GSS remains a very important part of Iraq's security and intelligence network and constitutes the eyes and ears of the regime at a local level. The GSS has a sizeable number of personnel, numbering about 8,000, and maintains a presence in every town and village. The GSS has a reputation for brutality and bloodshed.

Details of the GSS' work that emerged in the late 1990s indicated that in some respects it operates in a similar fashion to the Stasi, the former East German secret police. The GSS has built up a huge archive of files on private citizens through a vast network of informants, and also through other forms of covert surveillance. Indications are that files on citizens are extremely detailed, with no piece of information considered too insignificant to include. The files are understood to include details of a citizen's family, education, work career, friends and former friends, and any other data that might have come to light as a result of information from informants or other sources.

As part of intelligence gathering operations, members of the GSS Technical Directorate routinely place electronic listening devices in premises, including private homes, hotels, restaurants and other public places, and cars belonging to targeted individuals. Phone tapping is also widely employed, and the tapes of conversations covertly recorded through listening devices or phone tapping are kept on file, according to an informed source.

The GSS was one of the agencies that took part in the concealment effort designed to defeat the efforts of UNSCOM to detect and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The GSS has a security branch that detects and deals with any dissent found within its own ranks. There is also a military brigade of the GSS. A commander of this rapid intervention brigade was executed in August 1996 for alleged involvement in a coup attempt earlier that year.

An enormous quantity of GSS files were seized by Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq following the post 1991 Gulf War uprising. About 18 tonnes of files are now preserved at a special archive of the University of Colorado. The records are said to include orders for massacres to be carried out, arrest reports concerning rebels, lists of people turned in by informers, and also the names of informers. The files include photographs of people who were tortured or killed. Most of the estimated 4 to 5 million pages of documents are in Arabic but some are in Kurdish.

Al Hadi Project

The Al Hadi Project, or Project 858, is a little-known Iraqi agency responsible for gathering signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). Its headquarters is at Al Rashedia, about 20km north of Baghdad, and it also maintains five other stations, or listening posts, around Iraq. The total number of personnel is estimated at about 800.

National Security Council (NSC)

Based in Office of the Presidential Palace (OPP) in Baghdad, the National Security Council acts as a kind of umbrella group for the various security/intelligence agencies. Analysts believe the real power over Iraq's all pervasive security/intelligence network lies not with the NSC, sometimes seen as a type of think tank, but with Saddam's son Qusay, who oversees the network, with the assistance of senior Saddam aides in the OPP.

Note: The SSS, the GiD and the GSS each have a rapid intervention military brigade.

Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam's 'Men of Sacrifice')

This paramilitary force, with a strength of about 40,000, was founded by Saddam's son Uday in 1995. Many members are in their teens and were recruited in areas noted for loyalty to Saddam. The force carries out patrols and anti-smuggling duties, and is separate from the army command, reporting directly to the Presidential Palace. It is by no means an elite force, but can be called on in an emergency to help deal with unrest.

The force is commanded by Saddam's son Qusay with Staff Lieutenant General Mezahem Saab al Hassan al Tikriti as second in command.

There is a junior section of Fedayeen Saddam, called Eshbal Saddam, or 'Lions of Saddam', composed of school students aged 10 to 16. School students in Iraq are compelled by the authorities to undergo training with this junior militia. The authorities are much more selective in recruiting for the 'senior' militia, which is for those aged 16 and over. Only true Saddam loyalists are enrolled in Fedayeen Saddam, the members of which receive a salary.

Emergency Forces

Each governorate in Iraq has an emergency force, a lightly armed brigade with a strength of up to 1,000, for internal security duties. There are 18 governorates, but only 15 currently have Emergency Force brigades, the remaining three being in the turbulent, mainly Kurdish sector of northern Iraq.

It is understood that these forces come under the aegis of the Department of Emergency Forces Affairs (DEFA), located in Bab al-Shaykh district of Baghdad; this department in turn comes under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. According to the Iraqi Communist Party newspaper *Tariq al-Sha'b* (1 June 2002), DEFA was headed by Staff Major General Hakam al-Tikriti, who was assisted by Brigadier General Khidayir al-Rawi. Command of the emergency forces in the governorates is delegated to the local governor. It is understood that there are usually between three and four battalions of emergency forces in Baghdad, with two in each governorate. It is estimated that each battalion has a strength of up to 250.

One of the roles of the emergency forces in the governorates is to provide security to the governor and the local Ba'ath Party organisation. The forces also mount checkpoints and carry out operations against resistance elements. Other duties include the arrest of those seeking to evade compulsory military service. According to *Tariq al-Sha'b*, the emergency forces have carried out operations against dissidents in the Marshes area of southern Iraq. Emergency force members are generally deployed away from their home governorates, to ensure that they do not have excessive sympathy with the people among whom they operate.

It has been reported that the emergency forces have been provided with new vehicles, so as to enhance their rapid reaction capabilities. Military equipment is reported to include mortars (80 and 120mm) and vehicle-mounted 12.7mm machine guns. Riot control equipment is said to include tear gas. There is close liaison between the emergency forces and other elements of Iraq's elaborate security apparatus, including Military Intelligence and the Special Security Service.

Murafaqin (Companions of Saddam)

This is a group of Saddam's most trusted tribal kinsmen who guard the President at close quarters. They are the among the few in Iraq allowed to approach Saddam when he is alone, and while they are unescorted and carrying arms. They are all, without exception, members of various sub-clans of Saddam's tribe, the al-Bu Nasir. They carry small arms, and are sometimes in uniform, sometimes in plain clothes. One of them, carrying a sidearm, normally stands behind Saddam, guarding his back, even when he is meeting trusted aides.

The Murafaqin are divided into two main groups, and a smaller sub-group. One group, known as the Special Location Group, is responsible for Saddam's security in the various premises used by him and his family, including his living quarters. It is understood that members of this group are primarily responsible for static security at particular locations. The second group, the Salih or Mobile Group, is understood to have the role of staying by Saddam's side and guarding him no matter what location he happens to be in. The third group, known as the Kulyab, is made up of trusted individuals who form part of Saddam's domestic household - including his personal cook and butcher, as well as companions who accompany him on fishing trips and social occasions.

It is understood that a leading figure in the Murafaqin is Rokan Abd al-Ghafur Suleiman al-Majid, Saddam's personal bodyguard, who also oversees Saddam's relationship with the powerful Al-Majid clan.

He is one of the four individuals whom Saddam is said to trust unconditionally. Another is his chief troubleshooter and member of the Al-Majid clan, the notorious AN Hassan Al-Majid, military director of the southern region of Iraq, a cousin of Saddam and the man responsible for chemical attacks on the Kurds in the 1980s. The remaining two are Saddam's secretary, the powerful Abd Hamid Mahmoud, and Saddam's son Qusay, who oversees Iraq's security/intelligence apparatus.

Concealment Apparatus

Analysts believe that the Saddam Hussein regime mounted a major, concerted operation to thwart the activities of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose role was to eliminate Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It is believed that the concealment operation began shortly after the UN Security Council passed the relevant disarming resolution in April 1991. According to the dossier Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction released by the UK government in September 2002, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC), also known as the Special Security Committee, was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA, which was charged with eliminating Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

The dossier stated that the Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC), also known as the Military Industrialisation Office (MIO); scientists from all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes, and that the Higher Security Committee (HSC), also known as the National Security Committee, of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The UK report went on to say that the system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusay. According to the dossier, the system for hiding proscribed material relied on high mobility and good command and control, and used lorries to move items at short notice. Most hide sites appeared to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan, the dossier added.

Other sources say that a supervisory figure in the concealment was Saddam's secretary, Abd Hamid Mahmoud, assisted by the elite Special Security Service, or Amn al-Khass, headed by Qusay. A range of other security agencies also played a role, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), which deployed at least two sub-sections in the concealment effort - a covert operations unit and a covert procurement unit. Military Intelligence (Estikhabarat) had a role in concealment strategy, while the General Security Service, or secret police (Amn al-Amm) provided the services of its military brigade for concealment security purposes. The Special Republican Guard (SRG) also had a role in transporting, hiding and guarding sensitive materials. The al-Hadi agency, which has a SIGINT/ELINT role, sought to eavesdrop on UNSCOM communications.

One of the most important agencies of all in the concealment operation was the Military Industrialisation Office (MIO), which oversees Iraq's military industries, and which sought to conceal sensitive activities from UNSCOM. It is believed that the Special Security Committee, the sub-committee of the National Security Council which co-ordinated the concealment process, included among its members Abd Hamid Mahmoud, Faris 'Abd-al Hamid al-'Ani, the director general of the presidential office, and senior figures from the intelligence/security agencies.

To observe and monitor the activities of UNSCOM inspectors, the Iraqi government set up a special unit called the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD). UNSCOM personnel liaised with the NMD with regard to inspections, and NMD members acted as escorting officers when inspections were taking place. Analysts considered the NMD, headed by a general, to be part of Iraq's concealment effort, and UNSCOM head Richard Butler accused the organisation of frequently obstructing the work of his inspectors.

National Defence Battalions (Kurdish militias, or Jash)

There are a number of small Kurdish tribal militias that serve the Saddam Hussein regime as auxiliary forces in the Iraqi-controlled sector of the Kurdish region. At the time of writing, they are based in Kirkuk and Mosul. They are known colloquially among anti-Saddam Kurds as Jash, (a term that can mean army or 'little donkey', and that is sometimes used in a derogatory sense), or more formally as National Defence Battalions. One of the more prominent of the militias in Mosul is from the Zibar tribe, and is led by Latif Zibari. Another, from the Herki tribe, is led by Asad Herki. Saddam has always sought to exploit the differences and shifting alliances that have undermined the unity of the Kurds in northern Iraq.

The Jash from Mosul speak Kurmanji, the same dialect of Kurdish as the Barzani tribe who dominate the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), one of the main Iraqi Kurd parties, and would be used by Baghdad as a counterweight to the KDP. Likewise, the Jash in Kirkuk speak another dialect, Sorani, and are designed to counter the other main Iraqi Kurd party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, the members of which also speak Sorani.

It is understood that the total number of fighters that can be fielded by the *Jash* would be relatively small - about 1,000. They are armed mostly with light weapons, and receive payment from Baghdad for their services.

During the Iran-Iraq War the Kurdish tribal Jash was a much more significant element in the Iraqi military machine. At the height of their strength there were about 250 such battalions, with a total strength of about 100,000 men. They were under the supervision of Iraqi Military Intelligence (Estikhabarat) and the Secret Police. Some leaders of the Jash tried to hedge their bets, serving Saddam while seeking to maintain a relationship also with Kurdish dissident chiefs. Many elements of the Jash turned against Saddam during the Kurdish rebellion that followed the Gulf War in 1991, throwing in their lot with one or other of the main Iraqi Kurd parties, the KDP or the PUK. Former Jash were among the hundreds of thousands who fled to the frontiers with Iran and Turkey when the rebellion collapsed.

In late 1996, following the successful Iraqi military incursion into the Iraqi Kurdistan region when Iraqi forces joined with the KDP to attack the PUK, Saddam moved to revive the Jash, setting up the Zibari and Herki battalions; other militias have since been set up.

Youth Civil Defence

It was reported in July 1999 that the Iraqi military was to begin training young people in civil defence work. It was understood that the programme was to begin with students at Baghdad University being given a one-month course. There was a report that this might be the precursor to the launch of a new loyalist youth army, composed of adolescents aged 12 to 17 whose role would be to 'defend the cities during troubles'. The London newspaper *Al-Zaman* reported that the idea of a youth army was discussed at a 20 July cabinet meeting in Baghdad, and that proposals for such an army were being considered by a special committee under the chairmanship of Deputy Premier Tariq Aziz.



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3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 9 oktober 2004

Ons kenmerk DIS2004019688

Onderwerp Uw verzoek om gegevens inzake [REDACTED]

Geachte [REDACTED]

In uw brief van 12 augustus 2004, die ik door tussenkomst van de Landelijke Officier van Justitie [REDACTED] toegezonden kreeg, vraagt u mij om:

Alle, door derden, aan de MIVD verstrekte gegevens en/of informatie met betrekking tot de, in de door de MIVD gedane aangifte, vermiste goederen.

Ingevolge uw verzoek maak ik hierbij op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn in voornoemde zaak.

Bij de werkzaamheden van de MIVD is mij het volgende bekend geworden:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, wnd

w.g.

K.A.C. Hermsen
Commandeur

Ministerie van Defensie

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De Landelijk Officier van Justitie
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3000 AJ Rotterdam

23 NOV. 2004

Datum

Ons kenmerk

DIS/2004021741

Onderwerp

Uw verzoek om gegevens inzake [REDACTED]

Geachte heer [REDACTED]

In uw brief van 12 augustus 2004, die ik door tussenkomst van de Landelijke Officier van Justitie toegezonden kreeg, vraagt u mij om:

- Een risico-analyse met betrekking tot [REDACTED]

- Inzicht in [REDACTED]

Ingevolge uw verzoek maak ik hierbij op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn in voornoemde zaak.

Zoals medegedeeld in het ambtsbericht van 9 oktober jl., nr. Dis/2004019688 zijn op 3 april 2004 [REDACTED]

bestaat de mogelijkheid dat [REDACTED] Hieronder wordt de mogelijke schade beschreven die ontstaat indien [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Met betrekking tot eventuele economische schade die [REDACTED] heeft opgeleverd of nog kan opleveren, kan ik u geen mededelingen doen. Voor informatie hieromtrent kunt u desgewenst contact opnemen met de Landsadvocaat.


Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, wnd


K.A.C. Hermsen
Commandeur

Defensie

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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Datum 22 DEC. 2004

Ons kenmerk DIS 2004024390

Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake moslimextremisme in Heerlen

Telefoon (070) [REDACTED]

Fax (070) [REDACTED]

Geachte [REDACTED]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten en die als mogelijk betrouwbaar kunnen worden gekwalificeerd.

Bij de uitvoering van de aan de MIVD opgedragen wettelijke taken heb ik uit mogelijk betrouwbare bron vernomen dat [REDACTED] betrokken is bij zaken met een moslimextremistisch karakter. [REDACTED] behoort vermoedelijk tot een extremistische moslimorganisatie. Welke organisatie dit zou betreffen is onbekend. Via [REDACTED] zouden onder meer wapens worden gefinancierd. Hiermee zou een bedrag van 1 á 2 miljoen dollar zijn gemoeid.


Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst


B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor



2004024390

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Militaire Inlichtingen- en
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3000 AJ Rotterdam

Datum 22 DEC. 2004

Ons kenmerk Dis 2004024394

Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake mogelijk lidmaatschap motorclubs militairen

Telefoon (070) [REDACTED]

Fax (070) [REDACTED]

Geachte [REDACTED]

Hierbij maak ik op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor de opsporing of vervolging van strafbare feiten.

Uit betrouwbare bron is vernomen dat een aantal personeelsleden van het Korps Commando Troepen (KCT) hoogstwaarschijnlijk lid is van of nauw betrokken is bij een aan de Hells Angels gelieerde motorclub.

Het betreft de volgende personen:

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]



2004024394

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.

4. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Betrokkene 1) is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Betrokkene 2) is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Betrokkene 3) is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


Ook betrokkene 4) is [REDACTED]

Ik ga er van uit u hiermee voldoende te hebben geïnformeerd. Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

[REDACTED]

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
voor deze,
Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst



B. Dedden
Generaal-majoor

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Datum 22 DEC. 2004

Ons kenmerk Dis/200402M395

Onderwerp Ambtsbericht inzake inzet van chemische wapens in Irak in de jaren
1984 t/m 1988 met als bijlage CD rom

Geachte [REDACTED]

Enige tijd geleden bent u, tezamen met enkele leden van het team Internationale Misdrijven van de Nationale Recherche, bij de MIVD op bezoek geweest in verband met een strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar de inzet van chemische wapens in Irak in de jaren 1984 t/m 1988.

Bij deze gelegenheid is over een aantal onderwerpen nadere informatie toegezegd. Gelet hierop doe ik u thans op grond van artikel 38 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 melding van gegevens waarvan ik in kennis ben gesteld en die mogelijk van belang zijn voor uw onderzoek.

Het betreft gegevens over:

1. De Al-Muthanna Chemical Facility
Over deze productiefaciliteit is achtergrondinformatie en, zo mogelijk, een foto van het moment dat de faciliteit nog in gebruik was, gevraagd.
2. De mogelijke inzet van chemische wapens in de zuidelijke moerasgebieden.
3. De Anfal-operatie
Er is reeds veel informatie bekend uit open bron. Daarnaast werd gevraagd om eventuele informatie uit gesloten bron.
4. Vluchtgegevens over de periode 1984 - 1988 van de vluchten van m.n. de Fitters en Floggers die vanaf Kirkuk en vnl. Samarra-East vlogen.
5. Eventuele overige informatie over dit onderwerp bekend bij de MIVD.

Bij beantwoording datum, ons kenmerk en onderwerp vermelden.



2004024395

Ad 1. Al-Muthanna Chemical Facility

Voor achtergrondinformatie wordt verwezen naar de Annex B van deel III uit het eindrapport van de Iraqi Survey Group (zie bijgaande cd-rom). Deze Annex geeft een zeer gedetailleerd beeld met geschiedenis, activiteiten, plattegrond, productievolume per jaar en grond- en luchtfoto's van het Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex (ook wel Muthanna State Establishment of MSE genoemd).

Hoewel de foto's uit het rapport alle van na Desert Storm zijn, geven zij een goed overzicht van de activiteiten van het MSE. Voor de volledigheid is een overzichtssatellietfoto (IKONOS na Desert Storm) toegevoegd met de aanduidingen van de relevante locaties.

Ad 2. Inzet chemische wapens zuidelijke moerasgebieden

Hoewel er aantijgingen zijn geweest van het gebruik van chemische wapens door het regime van Saddam Hoessein tegen de zogenaamde moeras-Arabieren (gebruik van mosterdgas in zuid-Irak 1996) is hier nooit enig bewijs van gevonden. Een en ander wordt ook verder beschreven in de (openbare) eindrapportage van de Iraqi Survey Group.

Ad 3. Anfal-operatie

Informatie hieromtrent (uit open bron) is opgenomen op bijgaande cd-rom.

Ad 4. Vluchtgegevens

In genoemde periode werd met zowel Fitters als Floggers van Kirkuk en Samarra-East gevlogen. Deze vluchten waren mogelijk betrokken bij de inzet van massavernietigingswapens. Informatie m.b.t. de inzet van deze vliegtuigen, evenals de Vluchtgegevens, zijn niet meer te achterhalen. Massavernietigingswapens in vaten werden door de toenmalige Irakese luchtmacht ruwweg gedropt vanuit transportvliegtuigen en helikopters. Fitters en Floggers dropten bommen gevuld met massavernietigingswapens.

Ad 5. Overige informatie

Uit nader onderzoek zijn voor het overige geen relevante gegevens naar voren gekomen.


Ik ga er van uit u hiermee voldoende te hebben geïnformeerd. Met vragen omtrent deze zaak kunt u zich te allen tijde tot mij wenden.

Hoogachtend,

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE

voor deze,

Directeur Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst



J. Dëdden

Generaal-majoor

Vragen naar aanleiding van bezoek Team Internationale Misdrijven van de Nationale Recherche

Recent is een aantal personen van het Team Internationale Misdrijven van de Nationale Recherche op bezoek geweest bij de MIVD. [REDACTED] is de leider van dit team; als OvJ was aanwezig [REDACTED]. Zij stellen een strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar de inzet van chemische wapens in Irak in de jaren 1984 t/m 1988.

Er is een korte introductie gegeven over taak/werkwijze team Irak. Daarna is een presentatie over de hoofdlijnen van het onderzoek verzorgd. Hierna is dzz. een briefing verzorgd over "de structuur van de toenmalige Iraakse strijdmacht en in het bijzonder van de eenheden belast met de inzet van bovenvermelde wapens".

Op enkele terreinen is nadere informatie toegezegd. Het betreft:

1. de Al-Muthanna Chemical Facility
Achtergrondinformatie over deze productiefaciliteit is gevraagd. Een foto van het moment dat de faciliteit nog in gebruik was, is welkom.
2. inzet van chemische wapens in de zuidelijke moerasgebieden
3. informatie over de Anfal-operatie
Er is veel informatie bekend uit open bron. Is er informatie uit gesloten bron en zou die beschikbaar kunnen komen.
4. vluchtgegevens
Zijn er vluchtgegevens bekend over de periode 1984 - 1988 van de vluchten van m.n. de Fitters en Floggers die vanaf Kirkuk en vnl. Samarra-East vlogen.
5. informatie bekend bij AHM
Heeft AHM in het verleden met asielzoekers gesproken die ook van nut zouden kunnen zijn ihkv dit onderzoek?

4 november 2004 .

- antwoord op vraag 1/Al-Muthanna Chemical Facility

Achtergrondinformatie over deze productiefaciliteit is gevraagd. Een foto van het moment dat de faciliteit nog in gebruik was, is welkom.

Voor achtergrond informatie verwijs ik naar de Annex B van deel III uit het eindrapport van de Iraqi Survey Group. Deze Annex geeft een zeer gedetailleerd beeld met geschiedenis, activiteiten, plattegrond, productievolume per jaar, grond- en luchtfoto's, van het Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex (ook wel Muthanna State Establishment of MSE genoemd).

Hoewel de foto's uit het rapport allen van na Desert Storm zijn, geven zij een goed overzicht van de activiteiten van het MSE. Voor de volledigheid is een overzichtssatellietfoto (IKONOS na Desert Storm) toegevoegd met de aanduidingen van de relevante locaties.

Bijlagen:

- Annex B Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex.



Iraqs_WMD_Vol3.pdf

- Overzichtssatellietfoto MSE.

- antwoord op vraag 2/ inzet chemische wapens zuidelijke moerasgebieden

Hoewel er aantijgingen zijn geweest van het gebruik van chemische wapens door het regime van Saddam Hoessein tegen de zogenaamde moeras-Arabieren (gebruik van mosterdgas in zuid-Irak 1996) is hier nooit enig bewijs van gevonden. Een en ander wordt ook verder beschreven in de (openbare) eindrapportage van de ISG

- antwoord op vraag 3/Anfal-operatie

Database zoekslag op 'Anfal'_(betreft info uit open bron)

GRAVE OF CHEMICAL ATTACK VICTIMS FOUND.

Another mass grave of chemical attack victims has been found in the village of Gop Tapa in Kirkuk Governorate (now part of the PUK-governed Kurdistan Regional Government), according to a report on "KurdSat" of 11 November broadcast from Al-Sulaymaniyah. That village was occupied during the Anfal campaign in 1988. The eight bodies, one family of six and two PUK peshmergahs, were identified. Gop Tapa is one of the villages bombarded with chemical weapons during Baghdad's campaign against the Kurds. According to the report, the

village was hit with chemical weapons on the night of 3 May 1988, when six Iraqi aircraft bombarded the village. The bodies were reburied in a state ceremony. (David Nissman)

2.1.1 IRAQI SCIENTIST ON IRAQ'S USE OF POISON

FBIS. Source: LONDON AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT IN ARABIC 19 MAR 01. Country: IRAQ
[INTERVIEW WITH IRAQI NUCLEAR SCIENTIST PROFESSOR HUSAYN AL-SHAHRISTANI BY MU'IDD FAYYAD IN LONDON; DATE NOT GIVEN]

[FAYYAD] THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS ASSERTING THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ANYMORE BUT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS DOUBTS. WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] IT IS KNOWN THAT THE IRAQI REGIME PLAYED A CAT AND MOUSE GAME WITH THE UN TEAMS TASKED WITH DISARMING IRAQ OF ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IT COMMITTED ITSELF TO THIS DISARMAMENT WHEN IT ACCEPTED THE UN RESOLUTIONS THAT IMPOSED THE SANCTIONS ON THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND WHICH HAVE CAUSED THEIR ORDEAL. THE IRAQI REGIME CONTINUED TO PREVARICATE WITH THE INSPECTION TEAMS AND TRIED NOT TO REVEAL THE WEAPONS IT HAS OR HAND THEM OVER TO BE DESTROYED.

ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ME, THE REGIME PLACED THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INSIDE CONTAINERS AND TRUCKS THAT LOOKED SIMILAR TO THOSE USED FOR TRANSPORTING AND PRESERVING FOOD. IT PUT ON THEM SIGNS THAT READ "ICE CREAM" OR "FOOD STUFF." THESE TRUCKS WERE PARKED IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS

FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS AND THE DANGEROUS MATERIALS WERE THEN RETURNED TO THEIR STORES ONCE THE INSPECTION TEAMS HAD FINISHED THEIR WORK AND LEFT. THESE TRUCKS WERE NOT TIGHTLY SEALED OR BUILT FOR STORING THIS TYPE OF MATERIALS AND THEREFORE SOME OF THEM LEAKED INTO THE ENVIRONMENT AND MADE INNOCENT PEOPLE SICK.

[FAYYAD] DID NOT THE INSPECTION TEAMS BECOME AWARE OF THIS PLOY?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] THE MATERIALS WERE PLACED INSIDE FOOD TRUCKS THAT WERE DRIVEN BETWEEN THE RESIDENTIAL AREAS. HOW COULD THE INSPECTION TEAMS REACH THEM? ANOTHER RUSE USED BY THE IRAQI REGIME WAS TO GET RID OF SOME CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS BY DUMPING THEM IN THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVERS SO AS TO PROVE TO THE INSPECTION TEAMS THAT ITS INSTALLATIONS DID NOT CONTAIN THESE MATERIALS. A HIGH-RANKING IRAQI OFFICER WHO OCCUPIED A SENIOR POST IN AL-RASHID CAMP (SOUTH OF BAGHDAD), ONE OF THE ARMY'S LARGEST CAMPS IN THE CAPITAL, TOLD ME THAT THE MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION AUTHORITY KEPT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS IN THE CAMP'S BARRACKS SO AS TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM THE INSPECTORS' EYES. WHEN ONE OF THE TEAMS WENT TO THE CAMP ONE DAY TO SEARCH IT AFTER RECEIVING A TIP OFF, QUICK ORDERS WERE ISSUED TO THE CAMP OFFICERS TO DUMP THESE MATERIALS VERY QUICKLY IN THE TIGRIS RIVER. THE OPERATION WAS REPEATED IN OTHER PARTS OF IRAQ AND SUCH MATERIALS WERE ALSO DUMPED IN THE EUPHRATES RIVER.

[FAYYAD] HOW DANGEROUS ARE THESE MATERIALS FOR THE WATER?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] SOME OF THESE MATERIALS DECOMPOSE IN WATER AND THEIR EFFECTS LAST FOR FEW WEEKS ONLY. BUT THE EFFECTS OF OTHER MATERIALS REMAIN FOR A VERY LONG TIME. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE DO NOT KNOW THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF THESE MATERIALS SO AS TO DETERMINE HOW DANGEROUS THEY ARE BECAUSE THE IRAQI REGIME USED MANY CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AND IN UTMOST SECRECY.

[FAYYAD] DID THE IRAQI ARMY USE WEAPONS MADE FROM DEPLETED URANIUM IN ITS WARS WITH IRAN AND THE COALITION FORCES THAT LIBERATED KUWAIT OR AGAINST THE KURDS?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] IT IS KNOWN THAT IRAQ DID NOT POSSESS THIS TYPE OF WEAPONS. THE ONLY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION THAT HAVE QUANTITIES OF DEPLETED URANIUM WEAPONS ARE PRIMARILY ISRAEL AND THEN TURKEY. ISRAEL USED DEPLETED URANIUM AS A WEAPON IN SINAI IN THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND IN 1982 DURING ITS OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON. THE MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF THIS WEAPON HAPPENED IN THE SECOND GULF WAR, "DESERT STORM." THE US FORCES USED THEM THE MOST AND THE BRITISH USED THEM TO A LESSER DEGREE AND, ALL IN ALL, 286 TONS OF DEPLETED URANIUM WERE USED.

[FAYYAD] WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF DEPLETED URANIUM ON A PERSON'S HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] DEPLETED URANIUM IS A RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL THAT LASTS FOR 4.5 BILLION YEARS. THIS IS THE AGE OF EARTH AND THE SOLAR SYSTEM. IN OTHER WORDS, ITS RADIOACTIVE EFFECTS WILL NOT END. URANIUM IS FOUND IN NATURE IN LARGE QUANTITIES AND THIS INCLUDES THE DEPLETED ONE WHOSE RADIOACTIVITY IS LESS THAN THAT OF THE NATURAL ONCE. (THE RADIOACTIVITY OF DEPLETED URANIUM IS 60 PERCENT OF THE RADIOACTIVITY OF NATURAL URANIUM). DEPLETED URANIUM IS THEREFORE NOT MORE RADIOACTIVE THAN THE URANIUM FOUND IN NATURE AND THE EARTH CRUST WHERE THREE PARTS IN A MILLION IS URANIUM. WE ARE BORN TO TOLERATE THIS KIND OF RADIOACTIVITY THAT DOES NOT AFFECT A PERSON'S HEALTH AND SAFETY.

[FAYYAD] SO WHERE DOES THE DANGER OF DEPLETED URANIUM LIE?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE DEPLETED URANIUM USED TO MAKE A SHELL HAS A HIGH-DENSITY QUALITY. URANIUM IS MUCH HEAVIER THAN LEAD. THEREFORE, WHEN THE SHELL HITS THE ARMOR BODY (TANKS OR ARMORED VEHICLES), IT BURNS AT A VERY HIGH TEMPERATURE, PENETRATES THE ARMOR, AND TURNS INTO CERAMIC SPRAY. I SAY CERAMIC TO CONFIRM THAT IT DOES NOT DISSOLVE IN NATURE OR IN BODY FLUIDS. THE GRAINS OF THIS SPRAY CANNOT BE SEEN WITH THE NAKED EYE BECAUSE A SINGLE GRAIN'S DIAMETER IS ONE THOUSANDTH OF A MILLIMETER (AROUND ONE MICRON, WHICH IS ONE MILLIONTH OF A METER). THIS SPRAY REMAINS SUSPENDED IN THE AIR UNTIL A PERSON BREATHEES IT AND IT THEN SETTLES SOMEWHERE IN THE TWO

LUNGS WHERE IT STARTS SPREAD ITS RADIOACTIVITY TO THE CELLS AROUND IT, THUS TURNING THEM INTO CANCEROUS ONES THAT MAKE THE PERSON SICK WITH CANCER. [FAYYAD] DID THE IRAQI REGIME TEST OR ACTUALLY USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] SADDAM'S REGIME DID NOT PRODUCE ANY CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPON BEFORE FIRST TESTING IT ON THE IRAQI PEOPLE OR OTHERS. THIS IS KNOWN. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE THE FIRST TYPE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PRODUCED BY THE IRAQI REGIME, WHICH IT USED AGAINST IRANIAN CIVILIANS AND MILITARY IN THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR.

[FAYYAD] WHAT WERE THE TYPES OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THAT WERE PRODUCED AND USED?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] IRAQ'S MILITARY INDUSTRIES PRODUCED MUSTARD, SARIN, AND TABUN GASES AND THE IRAQI REGIME STARTED TO USE THEM IN THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR IN 1984. THE ENTIRE WORLD KNEW THIS. THE IRAQI REGIME EVEN PRODUCED THESE INTERNATIONALLY BANNED WEAPONS WITH THE HELP OF EUROPEAN AND US COMPANIES.

[FAYYAD] WHERE DID THE IRAQI REGIME USE THESE WEAPONS, APART FROM THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BATTLEFIELDS?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] WHEN THE REGIME DID NOT SEE ANY INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO ITS USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR, IT PERSISTED AND USED IT AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND IN THE "AL-ANFAL" OPERATION TO EXTERMINATE THE IRAQI KURDS IN IRAQ'S KURDISTAN. THE MOST FAMOUS USE OF THESE WEAPONS WAS THE SHELLING OF THE IRAQI KURDISH TOWN OF HALABJAH IN MARCH 1988, WHICH KILLED 5,000 WOMEN AND CHILDREN BECAUSE THE MEN WERE WITH THE FIGHTERS IN THE MOUNTAINS. THERE ARE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THIS CATASTROPHE.

[FAYYAD] WHICH CHEMICAL WEAPONS DID THE IRAQI REGIME USE AGAINST HALABJAH?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] THE IRAQI FORCES USED A MIXTURE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO KILL THE PEOPLE OF HALABJAH. MUSTARD, SARIN, AND TABUN GASES WERE USED.

[FAYYAD] WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS OF THESE GASES ON THE PEOPLE AND WHAT EFFECTS DO THEY STILL HAVE?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] I WAS IN HALABJAH FEW MONTHS AGO AND MET THE SURVIVORS THERE. THEY RELATED TO ME THE TENSE MOMENTS OF THE SHELLING. ONE OF THEM TOLD ME THAT THEY ALL FLED TO THE SHELTERS AND TUNNELS WHEN THE IRAQI PLANES STARTED TO BOMBARD THE TOWN. THEY THEN BREATHED IN SOMETHING THAT SMELLED LIKE APPLES. THIS SHOWS THAT THE REGIME DELIBERATELY CREATED AN APPLE-LIKE SMELL TO TEMPT THE PEOPLE TO INHALE IT AND ASSURE THEM THAT IT WAS NOT HARMFUL. THESE GASES ARE HEAVY AND SINK TO THE SURFACE AND LOW AREAS. THEY KILLED THE PEOPLE WHO SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE TUNNELS IN ADDITION TO THE ONES KILLED ABOVE GROUND WHO WERE FLEEING FROM THE TOWN. THE IRANIAN FORCES WERE NEARBY (HALABJAH IS A BORDER TOWN BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN) AND THEY SUCCEEDED IN SAVING SOME OF THE PEOPLE AND TOOK THEM TO NEARBY HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CENTERS. WE ARE TALKING TODAY 13 YEARS AFTER THE INCIDENT AND THERE ARE SURVIVORS WHO ARE SUFFERING NOW. MEN HAVE COME IMPOTENT AND WOMEN SUFFER FROM ABORTIONS. THERE ARE ALSO CASES OF PHYSICALLY DEFORMED BABIES AND TYPES OF CANCER THAT WERE UNKNOWN IN THE AREA BEFORE. THE NEGATIVE PHYSICAL EFFECTS HAVE NOT APPEARED ONLY ON THOSE WHO TOOK THE DIRECT HIT BUT THE SYMPTOMS WILL ALSO APPEAR IN THE COMING GENERATIONS.

[FAYYAD] IS IT TRUE THAT THE IRAQI REGIME USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SUPPRESS THE MARCH 1991 UPRISING?

[AL-SHAHRISTANI] DEFINITELY YES. AFLATOXIN WAS USED IN THE SHELLING OF KARBALA. THIS IS A BIOLOGICAL CARCINOGENIC MATERIAL. TODAY'S STATISTICS, EVEN THOSE PUBLISHED BY THE IRAQI REGIME'S MEDIA ORGANS, SHOW THERE ARE MANY CASES OF CANCER AMONG THE PEOPLE OF KARBALA.

[DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: LONDON AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT IN ARABIC - INFLUENTIAL SAUDI-OWNED LONDON DAILY PROVIDING INDEPENDENT COVERAGE OF ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES; EDITORIALS REFLECT OFFICIAL SAUDI VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY.]

KURDISTAN ANNOUNCES GENOCIDE SURVEY. The prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Dr. Barham Salih, met with a delegation of representatives from all NGOs operating in the KRG. The agenda included KRG proposals regarding NGO work in the region, which will be forwarded to the UN in New York as well as to UN agency workers in the region. The purpose of the session was to better coordinate the vital work of NGOs in the region. It was also announced that the first phase of an informational

survey of victims of the Iraqi Anfal campaign has been completed, according to "Kurdistan Newslines" of 13 August. "Anfal" refers to the official Iraqi campaigns in 1987-1988 that systematically destroyed towns and villages in Iraqi Kurdistan and forced surviving inhabitants into concentration camps. The Anfal campaigns cost more than 182,000 people their lives and saw more than 4,000 houses destroyed. Of the affected towns, the best known is

Halabcha, which was hit by chemical weapons (mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX); five to seven thousand inhabitants died instantly. Official Iraqi documentation shows that Iraqi forces used

biological, and chemical weapons during these campaigns with clear genocidal intent. The Anfal campaigns constitute the largest civilian population ever exposed to chemical and biological weapons in the world. (David Nissman)

1) De Anfal campagne startte in febr 1988 en was gericht tegen de Koerdische oppositie. Hierbij werd op 16 maart 1988 gebruik gemaakt van chemische strijdmiddelen op de stad Halabja en 10 dagen later op Karadagh.

2. Lt Gen Ali Hasan al-Majid visited Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia during the week of 7 September as part of Saddam Husayn's diplomatic effort to garner support within the Arab world. Ali Hasan is one of the most notorious figures in Saddam's regime, in addition to being Saddam's paternal cousin and a close confidante. His career as Saddam's "willing executioner" took root in the late 1980s when Saddam charged him with directing the Anfal Campaign in the late 1980s against the Kurds. This pogrom led to the deaths of thousands of Kurds and the razing of 1,700 Kurdish villages. His willingness to employ chemical weapons against the Kurds earned him the nickname "Chemical Ali."

3. As Iraq's governor in Kuwait during fall 1990, Ali Hasan oversaw the interrogation of Kuwaitis and the looting of the country. After Operation DESERT STORM, Saddam charged Ali Hasan with suppressing the Shia uprising -- a task he undertook with zeal and ruthlessness. Several thousand Shia were executed or forced to flee Iraq. Since then, Saddam has used Ali Hasan as a stick to intimidate the Shia in southern Iraq.

4. Ali Hasan's infamous background is well-known; he is at the top of the INDICT war crimes list. However, that did not deter Saddam from sending him as a diplomatic envoy to North Africa earlier this month nor did it prompt Algeria, Libya, or Tunisia to reject him. Whether he took a direct flight from Baghdad to Algiers or traveled via Jordan is not clear. In Tripoli, Ali Hasan and Libyan Leader Qadhafi boldly issued a joint statement that stressed "the need for Arabs and Muslims to act in order to dismiss the accusation of terrorism against them."

(nu) 'Biggest' mass grave so far discovered near Al-Najaf [bis 13 mei 2003]

Within the framework of uncovering the crimes of the ousted Ba'th party against the Iraqi and the Kurdish people, the biggest mass grave was discovered on 11 May in Al-Shanafiyah area between Al-Najaf and Al-Samawah.

The mass grave contains the remains of thousands of the victims of the Ba'th regime. Most of them were women and children. They were recognized by their clothes. It seems that these remains may be of some of the thousands of Kurdish people killed during Anfal

operations at the end of the 1980s.

AYAD KHALIL ZAKI MUHAMMAD AL-BAYATI
22-May-03 GOVERNOR OF AL-MUTHANNA PROVINCE // FORMER COMMANDER,
ANFAL CAMPAIGN (SECOND OPERATION)

BAREQ ABDULLAH AL-HAJ HUNTA
22-May-03 BG FORMER COMMANDER, ANFAL CAMPAIGN (THIRD OPERATION)
FARHAN MUTLAQ SALEH

16-Jun-03 CDR COMMANDER, ANFAL CAMPAIGN (NORTHERN SECTOR)
Status: SURRENDERED 15 JUN 03

142 KHALED MUHAMMAD ABBAS CDR COMMANDER, ANFAL CAMPAIGN (EASTERN
SECTOR)

RASHAASH JIYAD AL-WITRA AL-IMARA CDR FORMER CORPS COMMANDER DURING
ANFAL

An Awful Truth Sinks In

After years of hope, survivors of Iraq's slaughter of Kurds now know the missing won't be coming back. At least 100,000 died.

By Richard C. Paddock, Times Staff Writer

SHORISH, Iraq — For 15 years, thousands of Kurdish families waited for their loved ones to return. They believed the day would come when Saddam Hussein would fall, the prisons in the south would open and the missing would come home.

But in the eight months since the Iraqi dictator was deposed, not a single person who disappeared during the Anfal military campaign of 1988 has returned alive.

The truth was buried in the killing sands of Iraq.

With Hussein gone from power, 263 suspected mass graves have been discovered, stretching from Mosul in the north to the remote deserts of the south. Many bodies were clad in the distinctive attire of the ethnic Kurds.

For the first time, many Anfal survivors are facing an awful reality: Their missing family members were the victims of a mass extermination campaign — abetted by Kurdish collaborators — that echoes the Nazi killing machine in its efficiency and brutality. It left at least 100,000 people dead.

Many of the missing were held just a few days before being loaded onto buses and driven into the desert. There, they were shot at night by waiting executioners and buried by bulldozers in shallow trenches.

"We had hoped for 15 years," said Aysha Chachan Salih, 35, who lost her husband, three brothers, her home and all her possessions in the campaign. "But after Saddam fell, we knew they were not alive anymore."

The word "anfal," taken from the Koran, means "spoils of war." The operation in Iraq's north was designed to wipe out support for Kurdish rebels by eliminating broad swaths of the civilian population. For six months in 1988, Iraqi troops and Kurdish militias arrested the inhabitants of suspected rebel strongholds and destroyed thousands of villages. Males of fighting age were the main target, but many of the victims were also women and children. In some villages, entire populations were slaughtered. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled for their lives, abandoning all they had. Some survivors lost dozens of relatives. Kurdish officials estimate that 182,000 of their region's 3.5 million people were slain during the offensive, but no one knows for sure. Iraq once admitted killing as many as 100,000 in the operation.

In a landmark 1993 report, New York-based Human Rights Watch concluded that the campaign amounted to genocide against the Kurds. Yet unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina's "ethnic

cleansing" and Rwanda's tribal massacres of the 1990s, the Anfal extermination received relatively little attention abroad during Hussein's dictatorship.

Despite rights activists' calls for action, no one has been prosecuted for the killings — not in an international tribunal or in the Kurdistan region, which won autonomy from Iraq in 1991 after U.S.-led troops invaded the country during the Persian Gulf War. Now U.S. and Iraqi officials say they expect to prosecute only the worst of Iraq's war criminals and are considering whether to create a truth and reconciliation process to expose abuses of the past.

Anfal survivors are among the Iraqis most grateful for Hussein's downfall.

"The Americans did well," said Amina Mohammed Aziz, 70, who lost four sons and all she owned in the Anfal campaign. "They freed people from terror and fear."

The Anfal was a carefully planned, well-organized military operation. Hussein's government kept detailed records, including communications between officers and names of the dead. Many incriminating documents were seized during the 1991 uprising against Hussein in which the Kurds won their autonomy. Many more records in Kurdistan have been recovered in recent months by U.S. and Iraqi authorities.

"We are finding execution orders and lists of victims," said Brad Clark, an advisor to the U.S.-led coalition's office of human rights. "The Iraqis documented everything they did. It was an incredibly arrogant attitude. They never thought anybody would check."

The Anfal was headed by Hussein's cousin Ali Hassan Majid, who went on to kill thousands more as Iraq's defense minister. He earned the nickname "Chemical Ali" for his use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.

Majid's most notorious chemical attack killed an estimated 5,000 Kurds while the Anfal campaign was underway, although it was conducted as a separate operation. He is in U.S. custody and is expected to face charges related to the Anfal operation and other crimes against humanity.

The Anfal was compartmentalized so that those involved — the soldiers, bus drivers, bulldozer operators, prison guards and executioners — knew only their own roles. Two Iraqi army corps and thousands of Kurdish militia fighters — known among Kurds as "mercenaries" — took part. The militias were essential to the success of the operation because they knew the terrain.

The mercenaries usually entered the villages first and rounded up the victims — often with false promises that they would soon be released. As the remaining villagers fled, soldiers and mercenaries looted the houses and set them on fire, taking the livestock for themselves. "Without the mercenaries, the Anfal could not have taken so many people," said Arif Qurbani, a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan spokesman and author of "The Witness of Anfal," which contains substantial documentation. "They knew the area and they deceived people." Most of those arrested were taken to the prison camp at Topzawa, just outside the northern city of Kirkuk. There, men and boys ages 14 to 50 were separated from the women, children and older men.

In the desert, groups of prisoners were tied at the wrist and shot with AK-47s while standing next to their freshly dug graves. Others were blindfolded and ordered to lie down in pairs in the bottom of a trench, then shot.

Only a handful of intended victims escaped. One was a 25-year-old Kurd named Ozer, who helped organize a revolt as prisoners were unloaded from their bus. Most of the men were gunned down, but Ozer managed to hide beneath the bus and flee into the desert.

"I passed only trenches filled with bodies," he later told Human Rights Watch. "I could tell what they were by the smell. I also saw many mounds made by bulldozers. The whole area was full of trenches with corpses."

Thousands of elderly detainees, along with some younger women and children, were sent to the worst of Hussein's prisons: Nugra Salman in the remote southern desert. The heat was overpowering and the inmates were fed a starvation diet of bread and contaminated water. Each day, prisoners would carry the dead into the desert for burial. Each night, wild dogs would dig up the bodies and eat them. Sherzad Salah was 13 when he was sent to the prison with his mother, Hanusha Hassan. His father and elder brother had been separated

from them at Topzawa. His sister died at Nugra Salman, but his mother gave birth to another girl, wrapping her in clothes taken from the dead. The baby survived.

"I remember that there wasn't food," said Salah, now 28 and living in the bleak desert village of Fatah Homer. "I did not expect to make it. I saw too many people dying right next to us." In September 1988, Hussein declared an amnesty and the surviving Anfal prisoners were released. Reports of executions in the desert trickled back to the Kurdish north, but most survivors preferred to believe the rumors — perhaps spread by Hussein's agents — that some of the missing had been seen in prisons and others shipped to nearby countries. The government of autonomous Kurdistan later helped keep hope alive by never declaring any of the missing dead.

Most of the survivors were women, many thousands of whom have been prohibited from remarrying because no government has ever declared their husbands dead. Without husbands, homes or livestock, the Anfal widows were doomed to poverty. Some families returned to their villages and rebuilt their homes, barely scraping out a living. Others had no choice but to move to newly established "collective towns," such as Shorish, where they live in concrete-block hovels and take whatever menial jobs they can find. While the survivors struggled to rebuild their lives, many of the Anfal's perpetrators did quite well for themselves — even in Kurdistan. In 1991, the mercenaries switched sides and supported the uprising against Hussein. In exchange, militia members received a blanket amnesty from the autonomous region's government.

"The amnesty was a very wise step," said Sheik Mohammed Basaki, 68, who has long commanded a Kurdish militia force but declined to discuss what he did during the Anfal. "By that amnesty, it gave them a clear heart to come back and fight."

The mercenary soldiers were incorporated into the legendary *peshmerga* — "those who face death" — and the leaders received party positions. Some still hold jobs in the Kurdish parties that govern the region.

"Some of them became high officials," said Qurbani, the party spokesman, "but an Anfal widow who had nothing still has nothing."

Now, as U.S. and Iraqi officials prepare to bring some of Iraq's worst criminals to trial, it is unclear how far down the chain of command they will go in seeking culpability in the Anfal. One top military commander unlikely to face charges is Sultan Hashim Ahmad Jabburi Tai, a former defense minister who surrendered to U.S. forces in September. The U.S.-led coalition has already granted him immunity in exchange for his cooperation.

According to documents found in Iraqi files, Jabburi Tai was a major general who headed the army's 1st Corps, one of the two main units that conducted the extermination campaign. Some Anfal survivors want revenge, especially against the mercenary leaders they say lied to them. "If I could, I would pile them all alive and burn them," said Hujara Walid, 30, who lost her four brothers in the Anfal.

At Topzawa, there is no hint today that it was once Iraq's most feared concentration camp. Used most recently as a military camp, it was stripped by looters within days of Hussein's ouster, right down to its doors and windows.

Soon after, Kurds who had been forced from the area in the late 1980s began returning. Finding their old homes destroyed, they moved into the camp.

Among the returnees was Eimad Samad Ahmed, 24. He had heard of mass graves nearby and began looking for them. They were not hard to find. Less than a mile from the camp, he came across human remains in a mound of earth.

"Everyone among our people knew there were mass graves here," he said. "I came and started digging and found bones. I became sick and spent two days at home."

The mound extends three-quarters of a mile along the road, and officials believe it contains hundreds of bodies. During a recent visit, the bones and clothing of at least one victim were scattered on the ground. Officials say there are six more mass graves near Topzawa and two dozen elsewhere around Kirkuk.

U.S. officials say teams of anthropologists will identify enough victims for evidence in war crimes trials, but there is no plan to identify all of the dead, a process that could take a decade.

Though Anfal survivors have seen television reports of the mass graves, without the bones of their loved ones, some still cling to the hope that their husbands and fathers, sons and brothers will come home.

"Since they haven't told us whether they are alive or dead," said Hassan, the former prisoner who gave birth at Nugra Salman, "we will wait for them until we die."

Antwoord op vraag 4/vluchtgegevens

In genoemde periode werd met beide types van deze bases gevlogen. Deze vluchten waren mogelijk betrokken (of zijn mogelijk geweest) bij de inzet van Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Informatie m.b.t. de inzet van deze vliegtuigen, evenals de vluchtgegevens, zijn niet meer te achterhalen. WMD-wapens werden door de toenmalige Iraakse luchtmacht in vaten ruwweg gedropt vanuit transportvliegtuigen en helikopters. Fitters en Floggers dropten bommen gevuld met WMD.

Antwoord op vraag 5/gegevens afdeling ██████████

Uit nader onderzoek zijn geen relevante gegevens naar voren gekomen.