

*W. Kas, met interesse etc.*

MINISTERIE  
VAN BINNENLANDSE ZAKEN  
B.V.D.

Kabinet Comm. der  
Koningin in Friesland  
Ingek. - 1 APR. 1963  
Reg.no.  
Class.no.

's-Gravenhage, 29 maart 1963.  
Stadhoudersplantsoen 25.

GEHEIM  
zonder bijlage Dienstgeheim.  
Exemplaar no. 14.

No. : 678.870.

Bijl.: - 1 -

Betr.: Sociale contacten met onderdanen  
van landen achter het ijzeren gordijn.

*117.* →

*Handwritten notes and signatures on the right side of the page.*

Wellicht heeft U enkele weken geleden via de radio  
nieuwsdienst vernomen, dat de Engelse regering al haar ambte-  
naren heeft verplicht sociale contacten met onderdanen van  
landen achter het ijzeren gordijn aan hun chef te melden.

Dit bericht staat niet op zich zelf. In het begin  
van het jaar hebben de Canadese autoriteiten nl. reeds gewezen  
op het toenemende contact op sociaal terrein tussen Canadese  
staatsburgers en officiële vertegenwoordigers van dergelijke  
landen, alsmede op het risico - niet in de laatste plaats  
voor de betrokken Canadese staatsburger - dat aan dergelijke  
contacten verbonden kan zijn.

In het U hierbij aangeboden extract van Nato Secret  
Document AC/35-D/467 worden nadere bijzonderheden vermeld over  
de wijze waarop de bedoelde vertegenwoordigers deze contacten  
tot stand brengen, waarbij tevens aanwijzingen worden ver-  
strekt hoe men zich, voor het geval deze contacten tot stand  
komen, moet gedragen.

Het wil mij voorkomen, dat de inhoud van dit docu-  
ment niet alleen voor Uw achtergrondskennis van belang is,  
doch ook gebruikt kan worden voor de briefing van die ambte-  
naren, die ambtshalve of om andere redenen met vertegenwoor-  
digers van landen achter het ijzeren gordijn in contact komen.

HET HOOFD VAN DE DIENST  
namens deze,

*Handwritten signature of B. Vreede.*  
B. Vreede.

Aan:  
de Beveiligingsambtenaar van de  
provincie Friesland,  
te  
Leeuwarden.

GEHEIM  
zonder bijlage Dienstgeheim.

EXPLOITATION OF SOCIAL CONTACTS BY COMMUNIST  
OFFICIALS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

1. The cultivation and exploitation of social contacts by officials employed in the embassies of Soviet and satellite countries abroad is a well-trying method of obtaining desirable information, and constitutes a continuing problem for the counter-intelligence services of western nations. A good example is a case in Canada of a civilian employee of one of the armed services, who was overly fond of alcohol and was continually in debt. He was a member of the Civil Service Recreational Association Chess Club, and at its meetings he fell in with several officials at the Soviet Embassy, particularly with the Second Secretary of the Embassy. The latter encouraged him to drink to excess, lent him money and began to press him for information about the service in which he was employed, and about other Canadians in whom the Russians were interested.  
The episode ended with the dismissal of the civilian employee from his job, the recall of the Soviet Second Secretary from Canada, and considerable embarrassment for the government, largely arising out of public misunderstanding of the circumstances of the case.
2. The RCM Police have detected certain recent changes of emphasis in the exploitation of social contacts by officials of Soviet and satellite countries.
3. The RCM Police point out that the most desirable agents, from the point of view of the Soviet and satellite intelligence services, are citizens of the target country who are communists or have communist sympathies. However, because of the disenchantment of many western communists and communist sympathisers in recent years, and the implementation and strengthening of security measures by the governments of western nations, it has grown increasingly difficult for Soviet and satellite intelligence services to penetrate the target government services and vital defence establishments with agents recruited on a purely ideological basis. They have therefore had to exploit other methods. The evidence indicates that one of the most successful, particularly noticeable since 1951, has been the exploitation of social relations with citizens of western countries, particularly with government officials, as a means of finding and developing potential agents.
4. The techniques employed by Soviet bloc officials in Canada fall into a pattern, one which has also been detected in other western countries. Social relations are usually exploited in either of two ways. Citizens, particularly government employees, are invited to social functions at Soviet bloc establishments where they may be questioned and manoeuvred into revealing information which would be useful from an intelligence point of view. Guests at Soviet bloc social affairs are usually plied with food and liquor, and the latter is sometimes pressed on them to the point of rudeness. They may be flattered and treated as though they are more important than they modestly indicate. Conversely, they may be treated brusquely in the hope that they may be needled into an indiscretion. The approach is varied to suit the character assessment which trained intelligence officers make of their potential recruits.

5. Secondly, Soviet and satellite officials may visit or join "cultural" or recreational organizations such as chess clubs, dance clubs or language schools, ostensibly out of an interest in the activity concerned. In this way they may develop contacts which can be exploited for intelligence purposes. It may be noted that in the above mentioned case of the Second Secretary, the Soviet official developed his contact with his target through membership in a civil service chess club.
6. Through these apparently innocent social activities, trained communist intelligence officers masquerading as ordinary diplomatic officials may pose a considerable danger to the national security, as well as to the future careers of the persons with whom they develop a relationship. The victims may unwittingly reveal evidence of character weaknesses - an overindulgence in alcohol, or a tendency to live beyond their means - which the communists might later attempt to exploit. They may also give valuable leads concerning other persons in positions of trust who might be of interest to the Soviets for intelligence purposes.
7. It must be borne in mind that the Soviet bloc intelligence services rarely undertake any immediate exploitation of social contacts for intelligence purposes. Rather, they are usually prepared to develop them patiently over a considerable period of time before any suggestion of the intelligence aspect of their interest is made. Thus they are able to give extensive study to the potential agent who is the object of their attention, and at the same time foster the impression that the aim of the contact is innocent and friendly. After a friendship has been reasonably well established, a potential agent may be asked to render seemingly innocent favours to his Soviet bloc acquaintance such as mailing his letters or storing some of his belongings. Soviet bloc intelligence services are known to use such services as a means of pressuring their contacts, often after long intervals, into performing more useful functions such as providing information about the employee's work or his fellow workers.
8. The RCM Police emphasise that a noticeable recent trend on the part of known Soviet bloc intelligence officers is the attention paid to junior and inexperienced personnel of government departments. Since the ban on Soviet membership in RA clubs, there has been a distinct tendency for Soviet officials to join private dance studios, language schools and other recreational groups where young people congregate, and at the same time to increase the number of social invitations extended to junior governmental personnel. Soviet and satellite intelligence personnel no doubt reason that young people in government employment afford a particularly attractive target because they tend to be impressionable and are not likely to be as cautious and discreet as their more senior colleagues, and because many of them, as time passes, will be likely to advance to positions of considerable responsibility and trust.
9. From the point of view of security, it must be assumed that the motives of communist officials serving abroad in cultivating local friendships are not entirely disinterested. There is enough evidence in this country and other western countries to justify the precautionary view that all such friendships have an unfriendly aim. It is known that Soviet bloc officials must obtain the approval of their superiors before entertaining Canadians or

joining local groups, and that they are required to report in detail on such contacts and on the personalities of the persons concerned. It is on the basis of these reports that the communist authorities decide, after painstaking study which may extend over many years, whom to attempt to exploit for intelligence purposes.

10. The rules set out below have been drawn up in an attempt to provide a uniform and sensible way of dealing with this problem. They have two objectives: first, to prevent compromise of Canadian security and second, to avoid placing the careers of individual public servants in jeopardy. They are not intended to discourage social contacts between Canadian and Soviet bloc citizens, in view of the potential long-term importance of such contacts in fostering East-West understanding.
- (a) The security officer should, at his discretion, inform all employees that officials of Soviet and satellite missions may attempt to cultivate their acquaintance, either through invitations to Soviet or satellite social functions or through common membership in social, cultural, or recreational groups, and should ask such employees to report any such invitation or contact to the security officer;
  - (b) the security officer should impress on employees that, while there is no harm in accepting such an invitation or in continuing to belong to such a group, they should however be cautious in any contact with Soviet or satellite personnel and should be particularly careful:
    - (I) not to disclose details about the nature of their work or their personal habits or problems;
    - (II) not to disclose information about their fellow-employees, friends or relatives, their habits or their employment; and
    - (III) not to drink too much; /
  - (c) the security officer should ask employees to inform him immediately of any questioning by a Soviet or satellite official which might indicate more than a casual friendly interest in them;
  - (d) the security officer should from time to time remind employees of the points made in (a) to (c) above.